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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
RICHARD FRANKLIN NORRIS,

CaseNo.20030817-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This is an appeal from a conviction and sentence entered on pleas of guilty to two
charges of attempted communications fraud, both class A misdemeanors, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §76-10-1801 (1999) (R. 1826-28) (in Addendum A). This Court has jurisdiction
of this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
ISSUE 1: Is Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801, otherwise known as the communications
fraud statute, unconstitutionally overbroad or unconstitutionally vague?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law.
Grand County v. Emery County, 52 P.3d 1148, 1151 (Utah 2002). A statute is presumed

constitutional such that any reasonable doubts are resolved in favor of its constitutionality.
Id.; State v. Lopes, 1999 XJT 24, ^6, 980?.2d 191.
ISSUE 2: Did the trial court have subject matter jurisdiction over this felony case
where:
A. during the six weeks between issuance and recall of a remittitur, the court accepted
for filing a felony information involving the same parties and some of the same conduct at
issue in the misdemeanor appeal, but stayed the matter pending completion of the appeal?
B. all prior charges filed in the district court had been dismissed without prejudice,
and the district court made no ruling that conflicted with the appellate courts' exercise of
their jurisdiction over the misdemeanor appeal?
C. the prosecution's multiple attempts to file a single viable prosecution against
defendant was accomplished in good faith and under circumstances evincing no potentially
abusive practices or vindictive motivation?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "The determination of whether a court has subject
matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which [this Court] review[s] for correctness,
according no deference to the district court's determination." Beaver v. Qwest, Inc., 2001
UT 81, Tf 8, 31 P.3d 1147. Questions regarding the scope of judical authority appear to be
questions of law, reviewed for correctness. See id.; Oliphantv. Estate ofBrunetti, 2002 UT
App375,t7,64P.3d587.

2

ISSUE 3: Should this Court address defendant's claims of plain error and ineffective
assistance of trial counsel where he does not identify any particular unpreserved claims to
which these doctrines should be applied and does not provide sufficient argument to establish
either obviousness or deficient performance?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: When appellant fails to advance an argument in
compliance with rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Court should decline
to reach the claim.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional and statutory provisions are relevant to determination of
the issues in this appeal and are appended hereto in Addendum A:
United States Constitution, Amendment V;
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, § 1;
Constitution of Utah, Article I, §§ 7 and 15;
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1999).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
1. The criminal conduct giving rise to these proceedings occurred from March
through June, 1993 (R. 0165).

!

Because defendant's challenges largely involve procedural aspects of this case,
and the procedural history is convoluted, it is presented in numbered, chronological
paragraphs to aid the reader.
3

2. The West Valley City attorney initially charged defendant in December 1994 with
four misdemeanor counts of communications fraud in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-101801(1) in the Third Circuit Court, West Valley Department (R. 0165, 0384, 0621-22).
3. In February 1996, on defendant's motion to quash the misdemeanor charges, the
circuit court judge dismissed the charges on the ground that the aggregate of the four counts
exceeded the circuit court's jurisdictional limit of $1,000 (R. 0165, 0387-88, 0678-83).
4. The West Valley City Attorney appealed the dismissal to the Utah Court of
Appeals (R. 0165, 0388, 0700-08).
5. In October 1996, the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office ["DA's office"] charged
defendant in the Third District Court with eleven felony counts of communications fraud (R.
0165,0176,0232,0392,0730-35).
6. Defendant moved to quash the felony charges because the West Valley appeal was
still pending (R. 0166, 0393-94, 0740). Judge Palmer granted the motion and dismissed the
charges without prejudice on December 10, 1996, noting that the State could refile the
charges upon dismissal of the misdemeanor appeal (R. 0166, 0232, 0394, 0740).
7. The DA's office immediately sought to dismiss the appeal (R. 0201-02, 0394,
0742). Defendant actively opposed the dismissal because of the prosecutor's intent to file
felony charges, but the appellate court dismissed the appeal on March 26, 1997 (R. 0785,
0788-89).

4

8. In early April, 1997, ten of the felony charges were re-filed on the belief that the
misdemeanor appeal had been dismissed (R. 1-6).2
9. Defendant, through counsel, moved to dismiss the felony charges on April 10,
1997, arguing that the necessary remittitur had not issued (R. 23-48). Judge Dever granted
defendant's motion and again dismissed the charges without prejudice (R. 1860: 27) (in
Addendum B).
10. Defendant, pro se9 sought dismissal of the charges with prejudice two weeks later
(R. 68-80). He did not file supplemental documents to support his motion until three months
later (R. 84-103).
11. The remittitur issued May 13, 1997 (R. 82), and the DA's office refiled twenty
felony communications fraud charges on May 15, 1997 (R. 2-11). In the meantime,
defendant asked the Court of Appeals to reconsider the dismissal of the appeal (R. 790,106667).

Defendant also filed a petition for writ of certiorari (R. 1067), then filed an

extraordinary writ to recall the remittitur because it issued prior to expiration of the time for
filing the petition for writ of certiorari (R. 210, 214, 791-92, 796, 1066-67).
12. At the same time, defendant filed in the trial court on May 20, 1997, a motion to
strike the most recent information (R. 35-80; R. 1864:4).

2

The record consists largely of pleadings and transcripts from district court case
no. 971008355, from which this appeal arises. There is also a pleading file and transcript
from the immediately preceding case, no. 971005698. Few citations to the latter case are
necessary and will be indicated in this brief in bold typeface.
5

13. Defendant's request for an extraordinary writ prompted the Utah Supreme Court
to order recall of the remittitur on June 26, 1997 (R. 0398, 0792, 0795). The Court of
Appeals recalled its remittitur by order dated June 30,1997, and defendant sought certiorari
review of the dismissal of the original appeal in both the Utah Supreme Court and the United
States Supreme Court (R. 0398-99, 0792, 0795). Both courts denied certiorari review, and
the case was again remitted to the trial court on October 30,1998 (R. 0166-67, 0216, 0233,
0399,0406,0792-93,0831).
14. While pursuing certiorari review of the appeal, defendant, through counsel, again
sought dismissal of the felony charges in the trial court on September 26, 1997 (R. 109).
15. On November 19, 1997, after several additional filings and appearances by
defendant in the trial court, and while the certiorari proceedings were under way, Judge
Dever denied defendant's motions to dismiss with prejudice, denied his motion to strike the
information, and declared that he would entertain no further hearings, motions or argument
until the misdemeanor appeal was remitted (R. 1864: 1-4; 1865) (in Addendum B).
16. After issuance of the final remittitur, Judge Dever again denied the motion on
December 4, 1998, and set the case for preliminary hearing (R. 153) (in Addendum B).3
17. The preliminary hearing occurred February 3 and 26,1999 (R. 1866,1867). The
State dismissed eight of the twenty charges when four victims did not appear at the

3

Judge Dever signed the order on February 2, 1999 (R. 0402, 1008), and defendant
unsuccessfully attempted to appeal that decision and to obtain certiorari review in the
Utah Supreme Court (R. 0402-03, 1010-14, 1016).
6

preliminary hearing (R. 0151; R. 1868: 27). Defendant was bound over on the remaining
twelve charges (R. 1868: 36-37).
18. On February 23, 1999, defendant moved to dismiss the charges, claiming
expiration of the statute of limitations (R. 159-217).
19. On April 16, 1999, the State filed an amended information accurately reflecting
the remaining twelve felony counts of communications fraud (R. 218-23) (information
attached in Addendum C).
20. By order filed June 8,1999, Judge Palmer denied defendant's motion to dismiss,
finding no statute of limitations violation (R. 0232-33).
21. The Public Defender Association, which had been representing defendant,
withdrew, and Gregory G. Skordas was appointed to represent defendant (R. 240-45).
22. Between September 28 and October 29,1999, defendant, through counsel, sought
and obtained an extension of time to file several motions, which he subsequently filed, both
pro se and through counsel (R. 264-68, 270-72, 273-82, 305-17, 319-27, 328-52).
23. At an October 21 motion hearing, the trial court granted defendant's supplemental
discovery request and denied three of defendant's other motions (1873:45-51,69-70; 80-84).
24. Two days prior to trial, on November 15, 1999, defendant filed a motion to
reconsider his request for substitute counsel and his motion to stay the proceedings (R. 3641123).

7

25. Defendant appeared for trial on November 17,1999 (R. 1536:2). Defendant was
accompanied by his appointed counsel as well as by an attorney defendant had retained to
represent him at trial (R. 1536: 12). After hearing argument, the court denied defendant's
motion to reconsider, his request for a stay, and his motion for appoiintment of paid counsel
(R. 1536: 2-10, 12-22, 24). The court also denied defendant's earlier motion for a bill of
particulars, expressly noting that defendant waited too long before filing it then failed to seek
compliance until the day set for trial (R. 1536: 22).
26. The court recessed after disposing of the pre-trial matters. When it reconvened,
defendant entered conditional guilty pleas to counts I and III of the amended information (R.
1536: 25-26, 53-54). The remaining counts were dismissed.
27. Two weeks later, on December 1, 1999, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty
pleas and again requested appointment of counsel (R. 1203-79). He supplemented that
motion fourteen days later (R. 1280-1333).
28. On December 20, 1999, defendant filed a petition for extraordinary writ, asking
for appointment of substitute counsel for his attempt to withdraw his pleas (R. 1457-76).
This Court denied the writ as frivolous on its face (R. 1477).
29. On January 3,2000, defendant was sentenced to zero-to-five years on each of the
two felony counts, with the sentences to run consecutively (R. 1481-88).

8

30. The same day, defendant sought a certificate of probable cause (R. 1489-95). On
February 14, 2000, the trial court denied both the application for a certificate of probable
cause and the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas (R. 1519-21).
31. Defendant timely appealed his conviction and sentence, and this Court reversed
and remanded the case based on possible confusion which appeared to exist surrounding
defendant's ability to raise a vindictive prosecution claim on appeal (R. 1592-97) (ruling in
Addendum D).
32. On remand, defendant withdrew his guilty pleas, and the matter was set for a
seven-day trial (R. 1614-16).
33. Defendant again filed a series of motions (R. 1639-41,1643-48,1649-1781). The
trial court granted defendant additional time, and the State responded to each motion (R.
1633-34,1782-1804). Thereafter, the trial court denied the motion to recall the warrant and
vacate bail (R. 1809). Several motions were not ruled on because of the subsequent entry of
defendant's pleas.
34. On September 8,2003, defendant entered conditional guilty pleas to two charges
of attempted communications fraud, both class A misdemeanors, reserving for appeal the
"narrow issues of the constitutionality of the charging statute and jurisdictional issues
previously raised with the Court and presently the subject of the appeal from judgment
in the Fourth District Court case, which is presently on appeal" (R. 1814-22; 1827-28).4

4

Defendant does not challenge the validity of his guilty plea on appeal.
9

The trial court conducted a rule 11 colloquy, and defendant executed his supporting affidavit
(R. 1814-22; R. 1883: 2-18) (affidavit in Addendum E).
35. Defendant was sentenced the same day to two terms of one year in jail, received
credit for time served and was released (R. 1823-26, 1827-28).
36. Defendant timely appealed to this Court (R. 1829-30).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS5
Defendant purported to operate a business that sold diet products (R. 0607, 0648; R.
1866: 11, 36, 57-58, 69, 75-76,115). During the spring of 1993, defendant ran ads in Utah
newspapers promising a $1400.00 per month salary and benefits for diet consultants (R.
0608, 0610-12, 0647-48; R. 1866: 8-11, 69, 95, 101). When someone answered an ad,
defendant would give a presentation and produce several contracts relating to the diet
products (R. 0608, 0610, 0613; R. 1866:9-12, 58, 95-97). Defendant purported to explain
the terms of the contracts and obtained signatures from several people (R. 0608,0611,0613;
R. 1866:12-13, 15, 31-32). While the individuals believed they were agreeing to take
delivery of the product to sell in conjunction with consulting, they were instead signing
contracts to purchase the diet products themselves (R. 0608-11,0614,0648; 1866:12-13,17,
104-05, 117). Defendant directed the individuals to use the product so as to have first hand
knowledge of it, then refused attempts to return the product, in part because it had been

5

The facts are taken from the amended information (R. 218-23), and the
preliminary hearing transcript (R. 1866 & 1867).
10

opened (R. 0608, 0612, 0648; R. 1866: 12-13, 17-18, 53, 59-60, 118-19). Despite
defendant's promises in the ad and in person, the victims in this case received no salary,
received none of the promised benefits, and incurred unanticipated debt (R. 0608, 0648; R.
1866: 12,18,32,42-43, 110-11,61,76-77,99-100,110-11, 115, 117-18). Defendant then
sued the victims in small claims court for alleged breach of the contracts when the
individuals refused or could not afford to pay for the diet products (R. 0648; R. 19, 63-64,
74,78,79-80,100,119,136).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Point I: Defendant raises several challenges to the constitutionality of the charging
statute in this matter. However, this Court should not review the merits of his claim that the
potential punishment to be inflicted constituted cruel and unusual punishment because he
failed to preserve the issue for appellate review.
Defendant's claim that the statute is overbroad is without merit.

Defendant

establishes no substantial overbreadth where the statute limits its reach to false speech made
with at least a reckless disregard for the truth. His claim that the statute is unconstitutionally
vague because of its use of three terms is equally without merit. Because the statute does not
implicate any constitutionally protected conduct, defendant must show that the statute is
impermissibly vague in all of its applications. The challenged terms all provide fair notice
as to what conduct is prohibited by the statute. The language of the statute provided
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defendant with fair notice that the conduct charged in this case, committed with the object
of obtaining money, violated the communications fraud statute.
Finally, the plain language of the statute unambiguously guides the prosecutor's
charging discretion. The legislature is free to define crimes and punishments and may
provide a more severe penalty for some variations of a crime than others, regardless of logic.
Absent any established ambiguity, defendant is not entitled to dismissal of his charges.
Point II: Defendant argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to accept the
information that was filed following issuance of what eventually became a premature
remittitur. However, the trial court had jurisdiction to accept the information for filing upon
receipt of the first remittitur. Recall of that remittitur six weeks later did not void the filing.
Further, once the remittitur was recalled, the trial court properly stayed any further
proceedings in the case pending receipt of the final remittitur. The Utah Supreme Court has
sanctioned such a situation. See Nielson v. Schiller, Judge, et aL, 92 Utah 137,66 P.2d 365,
368 (1937). Further, the trial court took no action and issued no order that conflicted with
the issues relating to the misdemeanor appeal in which the remittitur was recalled.
Defendant's claim of a due process violation arising from alleged vindictive
prosecution is not a jurisdictional claim and, hence, is not properly before this Court where
it was not preserved in defendant's conditional guilty pleas. Moreover, defendant fails to
establish any reasonable likelihood of vindictive prosecution or prosecutorial bad faith. The
prosecutors' conduct throughout this case in the filing of each and every information

12

demonstrates a reasonable good faith effort under the particular facts of this case to put the
appropriate charges before the appropriate court in the face of years of defendant's attempts
to hinder the prosecution.
Point III: This Court should refuse to address defendant's final claims of plain error
and ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Defendant fails to identify the issues to which
these doctrines should be applied, and he does not advance sufficient argument to establish
that the law involving any error was sufficiently "settled" that it should have been "obvious"
to the trial court or that any of his trial counsel did not exercise reasonable trial strategy in
failing to preserve any claim below.
ARGUMENTS
POINT I
UTAH'S COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE IS NEITHER
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD NOR VAGUE, AND ITS
PLAIN LANGUAGE ADEQUATELY AND UNAMBIGUOUSLY
GUIDES CHARGING DISCRETION BY PERMITTING EACH
COMMUNICATION TO BE CHARGED AS A SEPARATE OFFENSE,
THE DEGREE OF WHICH IS DETERMINED BY THE TOTAL
MONIES OBTAINED OR SOUGHT TO BE OBTAINED BY THE
SCHEME TO DEFRAUD
Defendant makes several arguments concerning the constitutionality of Utah's
communications fraud statute. Br. of App. at 14-36. He first argues that the statute is
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because it does not adequately define several words
used in the statute. Id. at 16-24. The lack of specificity, he argues, prevents the statute from
being construed so as to avoid impinging upon freedom of speech, requiring that it be
13

deemed "constitutionally overbroad." Id. at 24-25. Hence, he claims, regardless of its
applicability to this case, the statute is unconstitutional on its face and warrants reversal of
his convictions. Id.
Second, defendant argues that the statute violates the equal protection and uniform
operation of laws provisions of the state and federal constitutions. Id. at 25-32. He claims
that the statute provides "unbridled" prosecutorial discretion in deciding to charge a given
defendant with a series of misdemeanors or with aggregated felonies for the same offenses.
Id. Defendant argues that the potential for arbitrary discrimination and wide disparities in
the treatment of similarly situated offenders requires that the statute be held unconstitutional.
Id.
Third, defendant argues that the potential for prosecutorial arbitrariness gives rise to
the possibility of unduly rigorous punishment for those who do not deserve it. Id. at 32-34.
"Minor offenders," he claims, run the risk of being sentenced as though they were major
offenders, resulting in cruel and unusual punishment for those individuals, in violation of
both the state and federal constitutions.6 Id.

6

For the first time on appeal, defendant asserts that permitting multiple charges
based on the aggregate value of a scheme violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. Br. of Aplt. at 32-34. Defendant did not raise the
issue below, let alone make the trial court aware that he had any concern that the statutory
language "would drastically and unjustly increase punishment for communications fraud"
to the point that it "could readily result in a sentence so disproportionate as to violate the
State and federal constitutions." Id. at 32-33. Hence, it is waived on appeal. See Dean,
2004 UT 45, ^J13 (appellate court will not address an issue, even a constitutional one,
raised for the first time on appeal); State v. Munson, 972 P.2d 418, 421 (Utah 1998) (the
14

Finally, defendant contends that the ambiguous statute leads to the potential for
multiple charges against a single defendant for the same criminal offense in violation of the
double jeopardy provisions of both the state and federal constitutions. Id. at 34-36.
A.

Section 76-10-1801 Is Neither Unconstitutionally Overbroad Nor Vague
Defendant's overbreadth and vagueness challenges fail in light of the language of the

present statute.7 "In a facial challenge to the overbreadth and vagueness of a law, a court's
raising of a claim on appeal that was not included below as a condition to entry of the
plea waives appellate consideration of the claim); see also State v. Hardy, 2002 UT App
2 4 4 , ^ 1 5 , 54 P.3d 645.
Defendant's argument would also fail under the doctrines of plain error and
ineffective assistance. Br. of Aplt. at 49. It does not identify "settled appellate law"
which should have alerted the district court to the allegedly "obvious" constitutional
errors. See State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah App. 1997) ("a trial court's error is not
plain where there is no settled appellate law to guide the trial court."). Further,
defendant's claims necessarily stem from his unnecessarily broad reading of the
communications fraud statute, which reading was rejected below when the district court
rejected defendant's overbreadth and vagueness challenges. Hence, counsel is not
reasonably likely to have prevailed on a motion under the Eighth Amendment, and his
failure to advance one does not amount to ineffective assistance. See State v. Gallegos,
967 P.2d 973, 976 (Utah App. 1998) (counsel is not ineffective for failing to file futile
motions).
In any event, this Court should not reach the issue because defendant lacks
standing to make the argument. The argument relies on the "theoretical existence of a
penalty that was never imposed against him[.]" State v. Morrison, 2001 UT 73, \ 28, 31
P.3d 547. Defendant pled guilty to two class A misdemeanor charges, each carrying a
sentence of 365 days (R. 1823-28). Defendant received credit for time served, and the
court immediately closed the case (R. 1828). Hence, defendant lacks standing to argue
the constitutionality of a sentence not imposed on him. See Morrison, 2001 UT 73, \ 28.
throughout his brief, defendant includes references to arguments presented to and
rejected by the lower courts. Br. of Aplt. at 25, 39-45 (denial of motion for bill of
particulars, expiration of statute of limitations, use of expunged police report, lack of
candor in informations). As his view of the arguments was rejected below, and the
rulings were not preserved in defendant's Sery plea, they have no place in this appeal.
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first task is to determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of
constitutionally protected conduct." Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates,
Inc., 455 U.S. 489,494,102S.Ct. 1186,1191 (1982), reh'g denied, 456 U.S. 950,102S.Ct.
2023 (1982); accord State v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502, 505 (Utah 1987); Logan City v. Huber,
786 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Utah App. 1990). If it does, the statute will be deemed invalid for
overbreadth, and the Court need not reach the vagueness challenge. "If it does not, then the
overbreadth challenge must fail [and] [t]he court should then examine the facial vagueness
challenge

" Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S at 494-95; accord Hoffman, 733 P.2d at 505;

Huber, 786 P.2d at 1375. Section 76-10-1801 is neither overbroad nor vague.
L

Section 76-10-1801 is not overbroad.

Defendant does not contend that he was engaged in constitutionally protected conduct.
Instead, he claims that the communications fraud statute uMefwhich he was convicted~ls~
overbroad under the First Amendment and cannot therefore be applied to him or anyone else.
Id. at 19-25. Upon review, his claim fails.
a. The overbreadth doctrine.
As a general rule, "a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied may
not challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally

See Munson, 972 P.2d at 421; State v. Geer, 765 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1988); see also Utah
R. Crim. P. 11(1) (a conditional plea reserves the right "to a review of the adverse
determination of any specified pre-trial motion.").
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to others in situations not before the Court." New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767, 102
S.Ct. 3348, 3360 (1982); accord Hoffman, 733 P.2d at 505. The First Amendment doctrine
of overbreadth is an exception to this general rule. Statutory overbreadth "addresses the issue
of whether 'the statute in question is so broad that it may not only prohibit unprotected
behavior but may also prohibit constitutionally protected activity as well.'" State v. Hall, 905
P.2d 899,901 (Utah App. 1995) (quotingState v. Frampton, 131 P.2d 183,192 (Utah 1987))
(additional quotation omitted); see also Hoffman, 733 P.2d at 505.
Because the overbreadth doctrine is "strong medicine," Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
U.S. 601, 613, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2916 (1973), "[o]nly a statute that is substantially overbroad
may be invalidated on its face." City of Houston, Tex. v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458, 107 S.Ct.
2502, 2508 (1987) (citation omitted). It is not enough "that one can conceive of some
impermissible applications of a statute[.]" Members of the City Council of the City of Los
Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2126 (1984). The
overbreadth must be real and substantial. See Ashcroft v. A.C.L. U., 535 U.S. 564, 584,122
S.Ct. 1700, 1713 (2002) (citing Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615). This is "particularly [true]
where conduct and not merely speech is involved," as is the case here. Broadrick, 413 U.S.
at 615. Further, the social costs created by the overbreadth doctrine are great—invalidating
"all enforcement" of a law which otherwise targets "harmful, constitutionally unprotected
conduct" Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113,119,123 S.Ct. 2191,2197 (2003) (quotation and
citation omitted). The overbreadth doctrine is thus "employed [ ] with hesitation, and then
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'only as a last resort.1" Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769 (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613).
Consequently, courts "afford statutes a strong presumption of constitutionality, and will,
whenever possible, construe a statute so as to save it from constitutional infirmities." LM.L.
v. State, 2002 UT 110, If 25, 61 P.3d 1038 (citations omitted).
A person claiming overbreadth "bears the burden of demonstrating,' from the text of
[the law] and from actual fact,' that substantial overbreadth exists." Hicks, 539 U.S. at 122
(quoting New York State ClubAss'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1,14,108 S.Ct. 2225
(1988)). The claimant must demonstrate that the statute, "taken as a whole, is substantially
overbroad judged in relation to its plainly legitimate sweep." Id. (emphasis in original). "In
short, there must be a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise
recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court for it to be facially
challenged on overbreadth grounds." Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 801 (emphasis
added). Defendant has demonstrated no such danger.
b. The statute reaches only unprotected speech.
On the one hand, defendant argues that section 76-10-1801 requires no intent to
defraud, but merely a "desire to obtain something of value[.]" Br. of Aplt. at 18-19. He
claims that the elements of the statute are satisfied as long as there is established a "false
communication, behavior, or material omission designed to garner 'anything of value[.]m
Id. at 18, 23-24.

On the other hand, defendant correctly acknowledges that the statute

requires dishonesty and a "reckless disregard for the truth[.]" Id. at 22-23. Indeed, mere
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proof that a communication is false is not sufficient. The statute requires a showing that the
false communication was made with the requisite fraudulent intent—that is, proof that "the
[false or fraudulent] pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions made or
omitted were made or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregardfor the
truths Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(7) (emphasis added).
Defendant nevertheless derides the statute, claiming it reaches to falsities made
outside "any discrete area of legitimate state control," "does not distinguish between fact and
opinion," and consequently "portends to punish significant amounts of constitutionally
protected speech." Br. of Aplt. at 21. He essentially challenges the statute's reach to falsities
made with "a reckless disregard for the truth[.]" Id. at 22. He posits three hypothetical
examples where the communications fraud statute could assertedly impinge on protected
speech: (1) a columnist who "intentionally makes bold sarcastic false statements of opinion"
to improve human behavior, national politics, or column sales; (2) political candidates who
engage in "puffing" and political commentary "with a reckless disregard for the truth" to
achieve a political agenda; and (3) advertisers spouting inaccurate assertions about products
"with a reckless disregard for the truth" to achieve higher sales. Id. at 21-22. These
hypotheticals are inapposite for varied reasons. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872P.2d999,
1014-15 (Utah 1994).

However, the State need not examine those reasons because

defendant's claim fails at its inception. It rests on a faulty premise, i.e., that the government
may not prohibit false speech made with only a reckless disregard for the truth.
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"Untruthful speech... has never been protected for its own sake." Virginia State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council Inc., 425 U.S. 748,771,96 S.Ct. 1817,
1830 (1976). The Supreme Court has nevertheless held that the First Amendment affords
a measure of protection to "some" falsehoods in order to provide the breathing space
necessary for the exercise of fully protected speech, or "speech that matters." BE & K Const
Co. v. N.L.R.B., 536 U.S. 516, 531, 122 S.Ct. 2390, 2399 (2002) (quoting Gertz v. Robert
Welsh, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,341-42,94 S.Ct. 2997 (1974)). Courts have made clear, however,
that the "breathing space" does not extend to falsehoods made intentionally, knowingly, or
with a reckless disregard for the truth. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
279-80, 84 S.Ct. 710,726 (1964) (holding that public officials may not recover damages for
a defamatory falsehood unless it can be proven that the falsehood was made "with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not"); I.M.L., 2002 UT
110, f 13 (acknowledging falsehoods may be sanctioned if they are made knowingly or
recklessly); Frampton, 1Z1 P.2d at 192 (holding that "neither the Utah nor the United States
constitution protects acts made with the intent to defraud . . . . " ) .
Because the communications fraud statute limits its reach to false speech made with
at least a reckless disregard for the truth, its reach does not extend to protected speech.
Defendant has not, therefore, demonstrated that the communications fraud statute is
"susceptible of application to substantial amounts of [protected] speech[.]" Huber, 786 P.2d
at 1377. His overbreadth claim therefore fails.
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h.

Section 76-10-1801 is not vague.

A law that is not overbroad "may nevertheless be challenged on its face as unduly
vague, in violation of due process." Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 497. Defendant claims
that the communications fraud statute is unconstitutionally vague in its use of three terms:
(1) "artifice," (2) "communicate," and (3) "anything of value." Br. of Aplt. at 18. However
nothing is vague about these terms.
"[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal
offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858 (1983).
Vagueness claims, therefore, "'are essentially procedural due process issues, i.e., whether the
statute adequately notices the proscribed conduct.1" State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, ^f 14,491
Utah Adv. Rep. 41 (quoting Frampton, 131 P.2d at 191-92). "If a statute '"is sufficiently
explicit to inform the ordinary reader what conduct is prohibited,"' it is not unconstitutionally
vague." Id. (quoting Frampton, 131 P.2d at 191-92) (additional quotation omitted). Further,
a statute will not be deemed facially invalid "when a limiting construction . . . could be
placed on the challenged statute" or a portion of the statute could be severed without
disturbing the purpose of the statute. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613; accord Provo City v.
Whatcott, 2000 UT App 86, lfl[ 8, 14, 1 P.3d 1113.
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Moreover, where the statute "implicates no constitutionally protected conduct," the
Court will "uphold the challenge only if the [statute] is impermissibly vague in all of its
applications." Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494-95 (emphasis added); State v. Archambeau,
820 P.2d 920, 928 (Utah App. 1991). In such cases, the statute "must be examined in light
of the facts of the case at hand." Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495 n.7 (citation omitted).
As a result, a defendant whose conduct clearly falls within a challenged statute cannot prevail
on a vagueness challenge. Id. at 495 n.7.
As noted above, section 76-10-1801 implicates no constitutionally protected conduct.
Defendant must therefore demonstrate that the statute "is impermissibly vague in all of its
applications." Id. at 494-95 (emphasis added). This he has failed to do.
a. "Artifice"
Defendant first contends that the term "artifice" is vague. Br. of Aplt. at 18, 22-23.
Although "artifice" is not defined under the statute, it is commonly understood as a "trick"
or "a wily or artful stratagem." Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 124 (1993). Defendant
concedes that "artifice" is subject to such a common meaning, but complains that it
encompasses "any form of dishonesty." Br. of Aplt. at 18, 23. Such a complaint, however,
goes not to the vagueness of the term, but to its scope. "[A] statute is not unconstitutionally
vague [simply] because it is broad." State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960,966 (Utah 1989). The
question is "whether the statute imparts fair notice of what conduct is prohibited." Id.
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Because "artifice" is a term understood by "ordinary people/' it is not vague, as applied to
defendant or otherwise. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357.
b. "Communicate"
Defendant contends that the term "communicate" is vague because: 1) it is "given the
broadest possible definition under the statute," and 2) subsection one penalizes
communication "with any person," without regard to whether a single published utterance
reaches multiple people and results in multiple charges and without regard to any reliance
on the utterance. Br. of Aplt. at 18. The term "communicate" is specifically defined under
the statute to include all forms of communication. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(6).
However, as already noted, the broad use of a term does not make it vague. See Wareham,
772 P.2d at 966. The issue is one of fair notice as to what conduct is prohibited. Id.
c. "Anything of value"
Finally, defendant contends that "anything of value" is unconstitutionally vague
because it is not defined, and he posits hypotheticals where the "[ ]thing of value" could
include things such as "curry [ing] favor[,]" shielding oneself from embarassment, or getting
a date. Br. of Aplt. at 23.

"[T]here is little doubt that imagination can conjure up

hypothetical cases in which the meaning of [value] will be in nice question." Hill v.
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 733, 120 S.Ct 2480, 2498 (2000) (quotation omitted). However,
the object of defendant's fraud in this case was the obtaining of "money," and he has not
argued that the term "money" is unconstitutionally vague. See Br. of Aplt. at 14-25.
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Therefore, the statute clearly applies to defendant's conduct, and his vagueness challenge
must fail. See Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495 n.7.
B.

The Plain Language of the Communications Fraud Statute Provides Clear
Charging Direction in Conformity with the Federal Constitution
Defendant also argues that subsections (2) and (5) of the statute violate the equal

protection and the uniform operation of laws provision because the State could choose to
aggregate the value of the things sought to be obtained by an accused for purposes of
charging a single, enhanced offense or charge the defendant with separate counts for each
separate communication.8 See Br. of Aplt. 25-32. The plain language of the statute, however,
defeats defendant's claim.
L

The statute belies defendant's claims of ambiguity.

8

Defendant impliedly asserts his claim under the federal constitution. However,
near the end of his argument, he mentions the state constitution, citing to State v. Mohi,
901 P.2d 991 (Utah 1995). Br. of Aplt. at 30-32. However, he made no mention of a
separate state constitutional analysis below (R. 113-16; R. 153: 1-36). Neither did the
state or the trial court address the state constitution (R. 119-23; R. 153: 1-36).
Consequently, this Court need not reach the merits of a separate state constitutional
challenge. See State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137, 140 (Utah App. 1997); State v. Davis,
903 P.2d 940, 942 n.5 (Utah App. 1995), rev'don other grounds 972 P.2d 388.
In addition, the claims would fail under both the plain error and ineffective
assistance doctrines. Br. of Aplt. at 49. First, defendant fails to identify any "settled
appellate law" that should have alerted the district court to any "obvious" error. See Ross,
951 P.2d at 239 (a trial court does not commit plain error absent settled appellate law to
guide it). Second, the statute unambiguously directs charging discretion, permitting for
uniform operation of the statute. See text herewith. Hence, no obvious error existed for
the district court to identify, and no ineffective assistance occurred for counsel's failure to
submit what would have been a futile motion. See Gallegos, 967 P.2d at 976 (no
ineffectiveness for failing to file futile motions).
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Defendant concedes that one subsection of Utah's communications fraud statute
permits each communication made in furtherance of a scheme to defraud to be charged as
a separate criminal offense. Br. of Aplt. at 25, 32. Defendant also concedes that another
subsection of the same statute directs that the degree of the offense is determined by the total
monies obtained or sought to be obtained by the scheme. Id.

However, defendant claims

that nothing in section 76-10-1801 directs the prosecutor in choosing how to charge multiple
communications against a single defendant. Id. at 30-32. This unfettered discretion, he
argues, permits similarly situated persons to be treated dissimilarly at the whim of the
prosecutor. Id. Absent adequate charging direction for the prosecutors, he argues, the statute
is so ambiguous as to be constitutionally invalid. Id. However, defendant's argument
ignores the plain language of the statute and the law of statutory construction. The plain
language of the statute adequately directs the prosecution of multiple crimes and sufficiently
defines the offense to withstand defendant's constitutional challenges.
It is well-recognized that "[w]hen interpreting statutes, [a court's] primary goal is to
evince the true intent and purpose of the Legislature." State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, f 8,
52 P.3d 1276 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); accord State v. Hardy, 2002
UT App 244, f 10, 452 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. The best evidence of a statute's meaning is its
plain language, which the court must assume was selected "advisedly and in accordance with
its ordinary meaning." Martinez, 2002 UT 80, <][ 8. "'When language is clear and
unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left for
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construction.'" Hardy, 2002 UT App 244,f10 (quoting Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P.
%12, S75 (Utah 1995)). Moreover, courts must look to all provisions of a statute to "' avoid
interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative.5" Martinez
at If 8 and Hardy at f 10 (both quoting Hall v. Utah Dept of Corrections, 2001 UT 34, f 15,
24P.3d958).
Subsection (1) of section 76-10-1801 states:
Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or to
obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of false
of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and
who communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any means for the
purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of
[communications fraud].
Subsection (2) directs:
The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) shall be
measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or
sought to be obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1)
except [when the object of the scheme is other than the "obtaining of
something of monetary value"].
Subsection (5) of section 76-10-1801 provides:
Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or concealing
a scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act and offense
of communication fraud.
Defendant contends that the statutory language permits the prosecutor to choose, at
will, from four prosecutorial options, or a combination thereof, for any given case:
1.
2.

The prosecutor can charge each communication separately;
The prosecutor can charge each reception of a fraudulent representation
separately;
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3.
4.

The prosecutor can aggregate all communications into a single charge
targeting the overall scheme; and/or
The prosecutor can charge multiple maximum level offenses for each
communication based on the aggregate of damages.

Br. of Aplt. at 27-31. He argues that this unbridled charging discretion may occur without
any legislative justification for the disparity. Id. at 31.
When read properly, there is no unconstitutional ambiguity in the charging statute that
gives rise to all the above options. Id. at 32. Read together, subsection (5) plainly governs
the number of offenses permitted to be charged, while subsection (2) plainly governs the
degree of each of those offenses. See discussion, infra, at subsection 2. A proper reading
of that language establishes that defendant's second option is not valid under the statute.
Subsection 5 permits but does not require the prosecutor to charge for "[e]ach separate
communication[.]" See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(5). While he can charge for less than
each communication, he has no authority under the plain language of the statute to charge
more. Hence, where defendant's second option would result in an increase in the numbers
of charges, it is not permitted by the statute.
Further, all persons committing the offense of communications fraud are subject to
the same measure of prosecution: each faces prosecution based on the number of
communications they advance. See id. The prosecutor is unable to increase the charges
beyond that amount, i.e., to subject an accused to an increase in the number of charges
beyond what the accused's conduct establishes. He may, however, reduce the charges based
on a multitude of factors, although he is not required to do so. Further, where the statute
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dictates how the degree of any offense "shall be measured[,]" the prosecutor's discretion is
minimal. See id. (emphasis added).
Defendant cites to several communications fraud cases, speculating about what the
prosecutor in each could have charged under his interpretation of the charging statute and
pointing out how widely disparate the charges could be. Br. of Aplt. at 27-29. His argument
fails to establish his claim of unconstitutional ambiguity. Instead, the cases demonstrate that
prosecutors regularly choose to charge less than the amount permitted by the statute's plain
language. The cases were all properly charged under the plain language of the charging
statute, permitting, but not requiring, a charge for each communication (see infra, at
subsection 2). See State v. Smith, 2003 UT App 425, 2003 WL 22922435 (unpublished
opinion) (one charge for multiple communications with a single victim); State v. Nichols,
2003 UT App 287,76 P.3d 1173, cert, denied, 84 P.3d 249 (Utah 2003) (five charges for five
victims involved in the sale of three cars; three victims owned the cars defendant was to sell,
and two victims were buyers; multiple communications to some victims was apparent); State
v. Silva, 2000 UT App 292, 13 P.3d 604 (one charge for a single taped call to the victim; the
subsequent eight calls were taped and used at trial as voice identification evidence); State v.
Ross, 951 P.2d 236 (Utah App. 1997) (defendant had one person cash thirty-five to forty
forged checks for him over a period of time, nine checks were recovered, and the forgeries
were proven to be worth at least $10,500; one charge of communications fraud for soliciting
the person to cash the checks; appellate challenge and affirmance were based on value of
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fraud).9 In each of these cases, the prosecutor was permitted by the charging statute to charge
for each communication, but chose, instead, to charge based on the number of victims.
Because it is the prerogative of the legislature to define crimes and punishments, this
Court may not "comment on the legislature's wisdom" in enacting criminal statutes.
Martinez, 2002 UT 80, ^f 15. Nor is a penalty susceptible to challenge merely because it is
more severe for some variations of a crime than others. Cf State v. Mace, 921 P.2d 1372,
1377 (Utah 1996) (recognizing that an appellate court "may not require the legislature to
select the least severe penalty possible"). Indeed, the legislature may impose harsher
penalties on certain crimes even if logic does not compel them to do so. State v. Clark, 632
P.2d 841, 843 (Utah 1981) (recognizing that "[i]t is not unconstitutional for a state to impose
a more severe penalty for a particular type of crime than the penalty which is imposed with
respect to the general category of crimes to which the special crime is related or of which it
is a subcategory"). See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1 )(e) (making communications
fraud a second degree felony whenever the object sought to be obtained by the scheme is
"other than the obtaining of something of monetary value"); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-

9

The remaining opinion contains insufficient information to review the basis of
those charges. See State v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, 17 P.3d 1153 (five
communications fraud convictions challenged for one of two defendants involving
accounting and billing practices, more than twelve patients and related insurance forms
were produced at trial, but no information on the number of insurance providers
defendant billed for services not rendered).
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412(l)(a)(iv) & (b)(iii) (1999) (making theft of any item from "the person of another" a
second degree felony and theft of a chicken or any livestock a third degree felony).
In sum, section 76-10-1801 reflects the legislature5s prerogative to consider not only
the injury caused by a fraudulent scheme, but also the nature and breadth of the scheme in
determining culpability. Cf State v. Kent ,945?.2d 145,148(UtahApp. 1997) (recognizing
legitimacy of legislature providing greater punishment for computer fraud simply because
computer crimes are "difficult to police and have a greater potential for ruinous
consequences").
Z,

Section 76-10-1801 Clearly Establishes The Unit of Prosecution,

Clearly, the legislative prerogative to define crimes and punishments must be
exercised within constitutional parameters. In reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, a
court is obligated to presume the statute valid and "resolve any reasonable doubts in favor
of constitutionality." Martinez, 2002 UT 80, ^ 6 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Moreover, a "'statute should be held valid unless there is a clear, complete and
unmistakable violation of some provision of the constitution.'" State v. Tebbs, 786 P.2d 775,
778 (Utah App. 1990) (quotingPride Club, Inc. v. State, 481 P.2d669,670-71 (Utah 1971)).
Here, defendant argues subsections (2) and (5) cannot both apply because such a result
would subject him to multiple prosecutions for the same offense and, thereby, violate the
federal prohibition against double jeopardy. Br. of Aplt. at 32-35.

More specifically,

defendant contends that section 76-10-1801 does not clearly define the allowable "unit of
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prosecution" and, therefore, the statue is ambiguous. Id. at 35. Because section 76-10-1801
plainly defines the allowable "unit of prosecution" and that unit permits multiple felonies to
be charged, defendant's constitutional arguments fail.
The Fifth Amendment to the federal constitution prohibits multiple punishments for
the same offense.10 State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1230 (Utah 1998). This variation of
double jeopardy, commonly referred to as "multiplicity," "prohibits the Government from
charging a single offense in several counts and is intended to prevent multiple punishments
for the same act." State v. Morrison, 2001 UT 73, f 24, 31 P.3d 547 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Whether charges are multiplicitious is resolved by determining
the allowable "unit of prosecution" intended by the legislature for a given crime. United
States v. Bell, 349 U.S. 81, 82, 75 S. Ct. 620 (1955). This, in turn, is resolved by the plain
language of the statute. State v. Adel, 965 P.2d 1072,1074 (Wash. 1998) (recognizing that
while determination of the designated unit of prosecution is of "constitutional magnitude,"
it is ultimately resolved by statutory interpretation and legislative intent); see also State v.
Green, 534 S.E.2d 395,400 (W.Va. 2000) ("[a] claim that double jeopardy has been violated

10

Defendant's argument is predicated on the Fifth Amendment, with only nominal
reference to the comparable state constitutional provision. Br. of Aplt. At 34-35.
Separate state constitutional analysis, therefore, is waived. See State v. Pizel, 1999 UT
App 270, \ 4 n.l, 987 P.2d 1288. In any case, state and federal double jeopardy
provisions are co-extensive. State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1230 (Utah 1998).
Because defendant's claim under the federal constitution fails, see discussion in Part
1(B)(2), he also would not prevail under the doctrines of plain error or ineffective
assistance of counsel. See id.; Gallegos, 967 P.2d at 976 (counsel is not ineffective for
failing to file futile motions).
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based on multiple punishments imposed after a single trial is resolved by determining the
legislative intent as to punishment

In other words, the Double Jeopardy Clause takes the

substantive criminal law as it finds it") (internal quotations omitted).
Here, the legislature clearly defined the allowable "unit of prosecution": section 7610-1801 (5) directs that every communication made in furtherance of the scheme is a separate
offense. Section 76-10-1801 (2) specifies that the degree of an offense is determined by the
total value of the scheme. An accused will not, as defendant claims, be punished for the
same act multiple times. Each criminal act, each communication to a victim, is punished only
once, but the degree of punishment for that individual act (i.e., each communication to a
victim) is determined by the overall value of the scheme. From a penalogical perspective,
the result is no different than designating all communications fraud, regardless of value, as
felonies and then prosecuting each communication made in furtherance of the fraud as a
separate offense - a statutory scheme followed federally and by some jurisdictions. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 1341 & 1343 (making frauds committed by use of mail, wire, radio, or television
punishable by up to a million-dollar fine and 30-years imprisonment); Badders v. United
States, 240 U.S. 391, 394, 36 S. Ct. 367, 368 (1916) (each communication made in
furtherance of a fraud may be charged as a separate crime); United States v. Kennedy, 64
F.3d 1465,1476 (10th Cir. 1995) (same); Ariz. Statutes §§ 13-2310(D) & 13-1801(B) (2001)
(designating any communications fraud, regardless of value, as a class two felony, but
permitting multiple fraud, "whether the amounts were taken from one or several persons,"
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to be aggregated into a single count, in the discretion of the prosecutor, so that if $100,000
or more is obtained, sentence may not be suspended and probation may not be imposed); Fla.
Statutes § 817.034(3) & (4) (2000) (permitting aggregation to determine the degree of the
crime of "organized fraud" (racketeering), while not providing for aggregation in
communications frauds, but designating all communications frauds over $300 as felonies,
and permitting separate judgments and sentences to be imposed for racketeering and for each
communication made as long as both involved the same scheme).
In sum, the plain language of section 76-10-1801 permits the number of offenses to
be determined by the number of communications made and the degree of any offense to be
determined by the overall value of the scheme. Where defendant met his multitude of
victims through newspaper ads, interviewed them at least once either alone or in groups, and
discussed with them their contracts, he could have faced more than the twelve th ird-degree
charges contained in the final amended information. Because the communications fraud
statute is neither unconstitutionally overbroad nor unconstitutionally vague, and its plain
language establishes the unit of prosecution and reasonably guides the prosecution in the
charging and prosecution of the number and degree of offenses, defendant's claims fail.
C.

The Statute Need Not Be Construed In Defendant's Favor Nor Stricken Entirely
Because No Ambiguity Exists.
Relying on his argument that the interplay of subsections (2) and (5) of section 76-10-

1801 is ambiguous, defendant acknowledges that under the federal law, the relief would be
to construe the statute with lenity, i.e., in his favor. Br. of Aplt. at 36. However, he urges
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that this Court should refuse to essentially rewrite the statute to provide the requisite lenity
and, instead, should strike the statute on constitutional grounds. Id. He argues that "the
unique separation of powers provision of the Utah Constitution" permits Utah appellate
courts to strike statutes which do not meet constitutional standards. Id.
Defendant does not argue that the rule of lenity has been adopted in Utah or that it
should apply to his situation. Indeed, Utah appellate courts have not formally recognized the
"rule of lenity" as a rule of statutory construction. See, e.g., Green, 534 S.E.2d at 403 n.13
("when the Legislature fails to indicate the allowable unit of prosecution and sentence with
clarity, doubt as to the legislative intent should be resolved in favor of lenity for the
accused." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Instead, after interpreting a
statute, Utah courts have applied the "rule of lenity" to accord a defendant the lesser of two
applicable penalties. SeeStatev. Kenison, 2000 XJT App 322, ^j 8,14P.3d 129 (quoting State
v. Yates, 918 P.2 136, 138 (Utah App. 1996)); State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 385 (Utah
App. 1997).
In any case, all courts agree that a defendant is not entitled to lenity unless a statute
is ambiguous. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576,587,101 S.Ct. 2524,2531 (1981)
(concluding that rule of lenity was inapplicable because no statutory ambiguity existed);
Kenison, 2000 UT App 322, <f| 10 ("where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous,
we do not look beyond the language's plain meaning to divine legislative intent") (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted); accord Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, ^f 10 ("[w]hen
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language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room
is left for construction") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, as no
ambiguity exists, as discussed above, not only does lenity not apply, but defendant is not
entitled to have the statute stricken as unconstitutional.
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ACCEPT THE
FILING OF AN INFORMATION IN THE FACE OF AN APPARENTLY
VALID REMITTITUR; THE FILING DID NOT VIOLATE THE
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION DOCTRINE; DEFENDANT'S
PROSECUTORIAL VINDICTIVENESS/DUE PROCESS CLAIM WAS
NOT PRESERVED AND, ON ITS MERITS, WOULD NOT PREVAIL
Defendant claims that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this
case, requiring that his pleas be withdrawn and the case dismissed with prejudice. Br. of
Aplt. at 36-39. He argues that the multiple informations in this case were filed in the district
court prior to receipt of the remittitur from the misdemeanor appeal, robbing the trial court
of subject matter jurisdiction, and rendering all the proceedings in the district court null and
void. Id. at 36-38. He also alleges a violation of the concurrent jurisdiction doctrine,
claiming that the doctrine was violated when the last case with Judge Reese (case no.
971005698) was filed while a motion to dismiss with prejudice was pending before Judge
Dever. Id. at 38-39.
Additionally, defendant argues that the filing of multiple informations violated his due
process rights, again ultimately robbing the district court of jurisdiction to enter his pleas.
Id at 39-46.
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A.

The District Court had Jurisdiction to Accept an Information for Filing
Following Issuance of a Remittitur and to Stay the Matter following Recall of the
Remittitur Six Weeks Later,
Defendant contends that because the prosecutor filed the May 15 information in this

case before the remittitur from the misdemeanor appeal was issued, the trial court was
without subject matter jurisdiction to accept the filing, and all proceedings which occurred
thereafter are null and void. Br. of Aplt. at 36-38. However, the specific facts of this case
as well as the relevant case law are against his position.
Defendant's argument omits a crucial fact: the misdemeanor appeal was remitted
before the State filed the May 15 information. A remittitur was received in the district court
on May 13, 1997, and the State put the aging case before the district court by filing an
information on May 15 (R. 0166, 0189-97, 0233, 0402, 0815-23).
However, defendant sought review of the Court of Appeals' dismissal of the
misdemeanor appeal, which prompted the Utah Supreme Court to recall the remittitur six
weeks after it had issued (R. 210, 214, 0398, 0791-92, 0795, 1066-67). Until that time, the
felony information was duly filed after the district court appeared to have properly acquired
jurisdiction. After recall of the remittitur, the district court refused to dismiss the charges on
defendant's motion but stayed the case pending issuance of a final remittitur (R. 0405,0810ii).
The same course of action has been approved by the Utah Supreme Court under
similar circumstances. See Nielson v. Schiller, Judge, et al, 92 Utah 137, 66 P.2d 365, 368
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(1937) (where suits between the same parties and involving the same subject-matter are
pending in two different courts in different counties, the supreme court stayed the
proceedings in trial court pending termination of the proceedings in the other court where the
first case was filed). Consonant with the ruling in Niels on, the trial court affirmatively
recognized the recall of the remittitur when it was brought to his attention. Whether or not
defendant had a constitutional right to seek the additional appellate review under these facts,
neither the State nor the trial court proceeded to move the district court matter forward. The
State limited itself to responding to defendant's multiple pleadings in both the appeal and the
district court matter, and the trial court ultimately halted defendant's filings, refusing to
entertain them until the final remittitur issued. Only when defendant's certiorari efforts
ultimately failed and a final remittitur issued did the DA's office and the trial court move
forward on the information pending in the district court.
Defendant lacks relevant authority to support his claim. He points to Hi-Country
Estates v. Foothills Water Co., 942 P.2d 305 (Utah 1996), to argue that an information filed
during a time when an appeal is prematurely remitted is invalid. Br. of Aplt. at 37-38.
However, that decision is not controlling. After a remittitur had issued following a direct
appeal in that case, the trial court modified the judgment upon which the appeal had been
based. 942 P.2d at 305-06. The appellate court thereafter recalled the remittitur to permit
the filing and disposition of a petition for writ of certiorari. Id. The court ultimately ruled
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that the trial court lacked jurisdiction "to enter a judgment or an order of any kind" during
the period between issuance and recall of the premature remittitur. Id. at 307.
In Hi-Country, the trial court' s action in modifying the judgment during the period of
a premature remittitur affected the rights of the parties and the issue on appeal. Id. at 307.
The mere acceptance of an information for filing had no similar affect on the parties or the
appellate court in the misdemeanor appeal here. There was no "judgment or an order of any
kind" entered by the trial court touching on the merits of the appeal, and no action by the
district court judge amounting to the "exercise [of] jurisdiction" in the sense used in HiCountry.
Moreover, even if Hi-Country applied, it did not restrict the district court's ability to
act as to every action. See Hi-Country, 942 P.2d at 307 (holding that the trial court could not
"enter a judgment" during the period of a premature remittitur, but agreeing, in dicta, with
a defense argument that execution of a judgment would not be stayed by the filing of a
petition for certiorari review). The Supreme Court held that the situation in Hi-Country
"exemplifie[d] the basis for the rule prohibiting the trial court from exercising jurisdiction
in a case while it is on appeal." Id. (emphasis added); see also State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358,
362 (Utah App. 1993). At the same time, the Court expressly provided that the trial court had
limited jurisdiction to act during the pendency of an appeal. Where, as here, the district court
merely accepted an information for filing while the court appeared to have jurisdiction, the
filing did not affect the appeal, and the district court stayed the matter as soon as it became
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clear the appeal was on-going, the district court's actions did not violate the ruling in HiCountry.
B.

The Facts at Hand do not Run Afoul of the Concurrent Jurisdiction Doctrine
Defendant claims that the prosecutor's filing of multiple informations in the district

court violated the concurrent jurisdiction doctrine. Br. of Aplt. at 38-39. However, the
district court's actions did nothing to conflict with any ruling of any other court involved in
this case and, hence, did not run afoul of that doctrine.
The doctrine states, "[w]here two actions between the same parties, on the same
subject, and to test the same rights, are brought in different courts having concurrent
jurisdiction," the court first acquiring jurisdiction may decide the matter before it without
interference from another court of coordinate power. Nielson, 66 P.2d at 368 (quoting
Escalante Co. v. Kent, 79 Utah 26, 7 P.2d 276, 278 (1932)) (additional quotation omitted).
The doctrine derives from comity, avoids "conflict in the execution of judgments by
independent courts," and prevents the "calamitous results" that would arise from any other
rule. Id.
The State filed it's action in the district court in the belief that the misdemeanor appeal
was completed. The district court's stay of the case after recall of the remittitur was entirely
appropriate to avoid a concurrent jurisdiction problem. The same solution has been used by
the Utah Supreme Court when faced with a concurrent jurisdiction problem. See Nielson,
66 P.2d at 368. InNielson, the Utah Supreme Court found a concurrent jurisdiction violation

39

in a situation where two parties, first involved in a district court matter in Sevier county, were
also involved in a dispute in Salt Lake county in which the issues were the same. 66 P.2d at
365. The Salt Lake court issued an order purporting to stay the proceedings in the Sevier
court. Id. at 367. The Utah Supreme Court found a violation of the concurrent jurisdiction
doctrine and imposed a stay of proceedings in the Salt Lake court pending completion of
proceedings in the Sevier court. Id. at 368. Where a stay of proceedings sufficed to cure the
situation in Nielson, the stay issued by the district court in this case was a proper response
under the facts at hand. Consequently, none of the conflict or "calamitous results" sought
to be prevented by the concurrent jurisdiction doctrine were at risk in this case, and the
"successive prosecutions" did not run afoul of the doctrine.
Defendant also complains of the prosecutor's filing of an information at a time when
defendant's motion to dismiss with prejudice was pending before Judge Dever based on an
earlier information filed by the State. Br. of Aplt. at 38-39. However, Judge Dever had
already dismissed the, previous information without prejudice pending dismissal of the
misdemeanor appeal (R. 0166, 0189-97, 0232-33, 0400-02, 0809, 0815-23). Add. B.
Because there were not two matters on the same subject testing the same rights in two
different courts having concurrent jurisdiction, there was no violation of the concurrent
jurisdiction doctrine. See Nielson, 66 P.2d at 368.
C.

No Prosecutorial Vindictiveness or Due Process Violation Exists to Warrant
Dismissal of this Case
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Defendant claims that the prosecution abused its power to harass him and to punish
him for asserting his rights in the misdemeanor appeal and repeatedly seeking dismissal of
the informations filed against him. Br. of Aplt. at 13. This vindictiveness, he argues, violated
his constitutional due process rights and robbed the lower court of subject matter jurisdiction
prior to entry of his guilty pleas. Id. at 44-46. He claims the matter is jurisdictional because
if the trial court had properly dismissed the matter on this basis, it would have been without
jurisdiction to accept his guilty pleas. Id. at 46. He seeks an order from this Court that the
information underlying his convictions be dismissed and the government be forbidden from
prosecuting him further on the offenses at hand. Id. at 45. These claims lack merit.
L

Defendant's Due Process Claim is Not a Valid Jurisdictional Claim and
Is Not Properly Before this Court

Defendant claims that the action should have been dismissed with prejudice prior to
entry of his guilty pleas, and that, had such an event occurred, the court would have lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to accept his pleas. Br. of Aplt. at 43. Subject matter jurisdiction
is an issue which may be raised at any time. See State v. Perank, 858 P.2d 927, 930-31 (Utah
1992). But defendant does not present a jurisdictional issue here. No more could be said of
this claim than any claim of error on the merits for which dismissal with prejudice would be
the appropriate remedy. That does not render the issue jurisdictional. As the claim is not
jurisdictional, it may be reviewed only if preserved below. See State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65,
77 (Utah 1990). Defendant's conditional guilty plea did not preserve this due process
challenge (R. 1822). Hence, this Court should refuse to review it.
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Defendant cites to Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), as establishing the
jurisdictional nature of his claim. Br. of Aplt. at 45-47. He argues that Blackledge holds that
a prosecutor's decision to file misdemeanor charges prevents the prosecutor from ever filing
a "more serious charge" against a defendant without violating defendant's due process rights.
Id. at 47. However, the Blackledge holding is not that broad, and its facts are readily
distinguishable from this case. North Carolina prosecuted Blackledge for a misdemeanor and
obtained a conviction. 417U.S. at22. Blackledge appealed, which entitled him, under North
Carolina law, to a trial de novo, annulling the prior conviction. Id. at 22. North Carolina
responded by obtaining an indictment on a felony charge based on the same underlying facts.
Id. at 23. Blackledge pled guilty and filed a federal post-conviction action. Id. The federal
court found that the "potential for vindictiveness" by the prosecutor following reversal of
defendant's conviction on appeal prevented the refiling of felony charges. Id. at 28. In other
words, it was defendant's pursuit of an appeal following his conviction and his prevailing in
that appeal that led to the potential for vindictiveness in the refiling of a more serious charge.
The same potential does not exist here. Defendant was not convicted of the
misdemeanor charges, and he did not take the appeal. The matter was dismissed by a judge
who believed the charges should have been felony charges from the beginning. The State
appealed. Obviously, the appeal created no incentive for the prosecutor to retaliate. As
Blackledge does not address the facts of this case, it does not support defendant's contention
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that this matter is jurisdictional and is entitled to appellate review without regard to the
preservation rule.
Should this Court deem the argument to be jurisdictional, it will find, upon review,
that the claim is without merit.
2i

The Record Demonstrates no Reasonable Likelihood of Vindictive
Prosecution or Bad Faith.

It is not the number of filings that establishes vindictive prosecution, but the
circumstances surrounding them that bear on the prosecutor's reasoning. To establish
vindictive prosecution, a defendant must show "either (1) actual vindictiveness, or (2) a
realistic likelihood of vindictiveness which will give rise to a presumption of vindictiveness.
Thereafter, the burden shifts to the prosecution to justify its decision with legitimate,
articulable, objective reasons." United States v. P.KR, Inc., 965 F.2d 848, 860 (10th Cir.
1992) (quoting United States v. Raymer, 941 F.2d 1031, 1040 (10th Cir. 1991)); see also
Blackledge, All U.S. at 27 ("the Due Process Clause is not offended by all possibilities of
increased punishment upon retrial after appeal, but only by those that pose a realistic
likelihood of Vindictiveness.5")/ State v. Brule, 981 P.2d 782, 784 (N.M. 1999) (defendant
must make an affirmative showing of bad faith or some showing of "a particularly severe,
prejudicial, and repugnant due process violation").
Defendant cites to a thirty-seven-year-old federal district court opinion, United States
v. American Honda Motor Co., 273 F.Supp. 810 (N.D., 111. Sep. 18, 1967), for the
proposition that due process does "not permit the government to harass a criminal defendant
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by bringing multiple charges, and requiring the defendant to litigate, in different courts." Br.
of Aplt. at 40.

However, American Honda is inapposite. In American Honda, the

government had issued multiple subpoenas around the country calling for the same massive
quantities of documents. 273 F.Supp. at 819-20. Because the case involved a national pricefixing conspiracy, there was theoretically no end to the number of subpoenas that could issue
for the same massive amount of documents. Id. The Fifth Circuit Court found that issuance
of so many identical subpoenas constituted "the sort of harassment which fundamental
fairness and the due process clause prohibit." Id. at 820.
In contrast, the instant case involves an honest effort on the part of the State to
properly place a single prosecution before the proper court by filing charges in the district
court only after the previous charges were dismissed without prejudice. Defendant, not the
State, kept the matter alive in numerous courts because of his repeated filings in various
courts. Even after recall of the remittitur, defendant was required to appear in the district
court while the appeal remained active solely because of his own repeated filings.

The

prosecution did not proceed with the case once the remittitur was recalled and refrained from
doing more than answering defendant's pleadings until after the matter was ultimately and
finally remitted.
Defendant's reliance on State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), is also misplaced.
Brickey involved refiling after the State failed to show probable cause at the preliminary
hearing. 714 P.2d at 647. It has no application to the situation at hand, and provides no
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support for defendant's attempt to prevent the prosecution's efforts to pursue its charges long
before a preliminary hearing was ever held. See State v. Atencio, 2004 UT App 93, ^f 21, 89
P.3d 191 ("new" evidence is required for refiling charges where the original charges were
dismissed on the merits). Defendant's use of Brickey in the absence of a case more
analagous to the one at hand reveals his claim for what it really is: an attempt to enlarge a
constitutional doctrine without support for changing the law.
"When no 'potential abusive practices' on the part of the prosecution are involved,
'there is no presumptive bar to refiling.'" 2004 UT App. 93 at If 13 (quoting State v. Morgan,
2001 UT 87, | 16, 34 P.3d 767). Mere inconvenience resulting from good faith refilings
does not implicate the due process clause. See Morgan, 2001 UT 87, f 22. This is because
the '"nature of the criminal justice system necessarily inconveniences those individuals who
have been accused of crimes.'" Id. (quoting People v. Noline, 917 P.2d 1256, 1264 (Colo.
1996)). Instead, the focus is on "potential bad faith or misconduct of prosecutors." Id.
Defendant cannot establish abusive practices or bad faith in this case. He touts the
multiple information filings and the increase in charges, but under the specific facts of this
case they represent only the prosecution's good faith attempts to place the prosecution and
the results of an on-going investigation before the appropriate court in the face of years of
defendant's attempts to forestall any felony prosecution.
The original misdemeanor filing became a felony information only because the judge
determined that he lacked jurisdiction over the charges. The West Valley City prosecutor
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appealed, demonstrating his belief that misdemeanors were proper and appropriate in this
case. The premature filing of felony counts arose from the transfer of the case to the DA's
office and the new prosecutor's determination of the appropriate charge given the
information it received and its additional investigation (R. 1788-89). Once the new
prosecutor discovered the filing was premature (because of the pending appeal), he sought
to dismiss the appeal. The prosecution gained nothing from the untimely filing, and the
State's attempt to dismiss the appeal negates a claim of bad faith. As the district court noted
at the time, charges could properly be refiled upon completion of the appeal. Upon issuance
of a dismissal order by the appellate court, the prosecutor again prematurely filed a felony
information. Absent a remittitur, the matter was dismissed without prejudice with no
discernable benefit to either party.
Two days after the remittitur issued, the State filed the May 15 information (R. 2-11).
Nothing suggested the remittitur was not final, and the additional charges were supported
by additional investigation (R. 1788-89). Defendant sought and obtained recall of the
remittitur six weeks later, ultimately resulting in a stay of the felony case. Once defendant
exhausted his appeal rights, a final remittitur issued. Because the May 15 information was
still pending in the district court, the judge was able to set the matter for preliminary hearing.
These circumstances demonstrate the prosecution's attempts to promptly move the
case forward in the most efficient manner possible in the proper forum. There was no forum
shopping or other abusive practice designed to benefit the State, to work to defendant's
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detriment, or to punish defendant for any exercise of his constitutional rights. The State
made every reasonable effort at every turn to remedy the problems that arose so that a
prosecution could go forward. There is nothing in the prosecution's pursuit of the case that
reasonably suggests a vindictive motive on the prosecutor's part.
POINT III
DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS OF PLAIN ERROR AND INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE SHOULD BE REJECTED FOR INADEQUATE
BRIEFING
Defendant's final claim purports to assert both the plain error and the ineffective
assistance of counsel doctrines as alternative bases upon which this Court should reach the
merits of the claims he argues elsewhere in his brief. Br. of Aplt. at 49-50. Defendant does
not identify which errors were plain or which points counsel should have advanced on his
behalf. He simply makes a blanket statement that "To the degree that the prior lawyers on
this case did not preserve the issues discussed above, this Court should" do so. Id. at 49.
This is inadequate to meet his briefing requirements under Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure.11 See State v. Garner, 2002 UT App 234, t 12, 52 P.3d 467.
Defendant makes no attempt to identify any specific issue for review under either
doctrine. Instead, counsel represents that all the issues raised in the brief were preserved

1

defendant's assertion of plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel is not
identified either in defendant's statement of the issues or in his Summary of Argument.
Br. of Aplt at 1-2, 13-14.
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below. Br. of Aplt. at 1-2. Each Point in defendant's brief includes multiple arguments,
some of which were preserved in the form of his conditional guilty pleas, some of which
were raised below but were not included within the scope of the pleas, and some of which
were not raised at all. Yet defendant makes no distinction between the arguments. Aside
from a brief mention of the legal standard for each doctrine, defendant's one-page argument
consists of two sentences, a single case, and a summary claim of prejudice. Id. at 49-50.
Defendant instead contends that the law contained elsewhere throughout the brief "should
have been plain to the trial lawyers and the lower courts" and that "the fundamental
principles of law" discussed elsewhere were "well-established" at the time of defendant's
motions. Id. at 49.
This form of argument does not meet defendant's burden to overcome "the strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance" in this procedurally-complicatedmatter. See Tennyson, 850P.2dat468. Without
identifying any particular claim or counsel, defendant has wholly failed to address the
presumption.
Neither does defendant establish the obviousness of any trial court error. He has
admitted in this appeal that the constitutionality of the charging statute is currently at issue
in other cases. See Conditional Stipulation to Necessary Extensions of Time for State to File
Responsive Brief, on file with this Court. Still, he makes no effort to explain why the law
on that issue should be viewed as sufficiently "settled" to permit any claim that the trial court
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should have recognized the unpreserved error(s). See State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236,239 (Utah
App. 1997) ("Utah courts have repeatedly held that a trial court's error is not plain where
there is no settled appellate law to guide the trial court.").
In view of these omissions, defendant has not provided any "meaningful analysis"
of the issues under either doctrine, and the State is unable to formulate a relevant response.
See State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT Ap 305, 989 P.2d 503. Accordingly, this Court should
decline to address defendant's claims of plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel.
See State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, \ 28, 48 P.3d 872 (declining to address inadequately
briefed issue).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the
defendant's convictions.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this > ^ d a y of July, 2004.
MARKL.SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

[S C. LEONARD
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that o ? true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee
were hand-delivered/mailed first class, postage pre-paid, to Elizabeth Hunt, attorney for
defendant/appellant, 3194 South 1100 East, #202, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106, this ^<£?ciay
of July, 2004.
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Addendum A

PART 18
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD
76-10-1801. Communications fraud — Elements — Penalties.
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or
to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of false
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and
who communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any means for the
purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of:
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is less than $300;
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $300 but is less than
$1,000;
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than
$5,000;
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000; and
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to
defraud is other than the obtaining of something of monetary value.
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) shall
be measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or
sought to be obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1)
except as provided in Subsection (l)(e).
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the
offense described in Subsection (1).
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in
Subsection (1) to permanently deprive any person of property, money, or thing
of value is not a necessary element of the offense.
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or
concealing a scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act and
offense of communication fraud.
(6) (a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow,
convey, make known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to
talk over; or to transmit information.
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use of the
mail, telephone, telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, computer, and
spoken and written communication. •
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses,
representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made
or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth.
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1801, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 157, § 2; 1990, ch. 79, § 1; 1995,
ch. 291, § 24.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, changed the value

ranges in Subsections (l)(a) through (d) and
deleted former Subsection (l)(f), making an
offense involving $100,000 or more a first degree felony.

f ONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
^
OF AMERICA

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process of law and just compensation clauses.]
, No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.

AMENDMENT XIV
ejection
1, [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protection.]
% [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
f. [Disqualification to hold office.]
I, [Public debt not tb be questioned — Debts of the Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
K
5T [Power to enforce amendment.]
Section 1. [Citizenship — Tfue process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
sut)|ect to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
iake or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
rocess of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic;ne equal protection of the laws.

t

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.
1896

Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the p r e s s — Libel.]
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of
speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the
truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall
appear to the jury thalt the matter charged as libelous is true,
and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends,
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right
to determine the law and the fact.
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10
11
12
13
14
15

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 14th day of April,
1997, the above-entitled matter came on for hearing
before the HONORABLE L.A. DEVER, sitting as Judge in the
above-named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that
the following proceedings were had.
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For the State:

ERNIE JONES
Deputy Salt Lake County
District Attorney
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah
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MICHAEL A. PETERSON
Attorney at Law
Salt Lake Legal Defender
Association
424 East 500 South, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
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1

prosecutions.

We needn't worry about this issue of whether

2 I Judge Watson has jurisdiction on & felony.
3

He does not. And

that's not before this Court.

4

THE COURT: Anything else?

5

MR* JONES:

6 J very reason.

Judge Watsqn dismissed the case for that

He said these should have been filed as

7 I felonies•
8

MR. PETERSON:

9

MR. JONES:

10

Well—

He said, I'm dismissing the case, go

ahead and file them as felonies.

11 J

MR. PETERSON:

12

MR. JONES: And so what we're doing is following

13
14

Very true.

Very true.

what he told us to do.
MR. PETERSON:

But that's the issue. Absolutely

15

r i g h t , Mi 4 , J o n e s i s absolutely r i g h t .

16

on appeal. An4 While that issue is pending in any way, shape

li

or form, we can't proceed.

18

THE COURT: V^ry well.

19

Anything further?

20

MR. JONES: No.

21

MR. PETERSON:

22

THE COURT:

And t h a t ' s t h e issue u p

No. Thank you, Judge.

I believe that based upon the present

23

status of the case in the Court of Appeals, that the very

24

issue of whether or not the defendant can be prosecuted,

25

either as a misdemeanor or a felony, or a single criminal

26

1

episode or not, that issue is before the Supreme Courts-I

2

mean, before the Court of Appeals.

3

Whether the defendant is using this as a ploy to

4

delay his trial and allow him to continue doing whatever he

5

wants to da is not an issue that makes a difference to this

6

Court*

7

The issue for this Court to decide is whether or not

8

the Rules of Procedures and th£ Rules of Appellate Procedure

9

limit what this Court is doing in this case. And I believe,

10

from my reading of the rules, that this taatter i^ presently

11

pending in the Court of Appeals and until the Court of Appeals

12

issues its remittitur, that this Court is prohibited from

13

proceeding.

14

Based upon that, I will grant the motion in this

15

matter to dismiss Without prejudice.

16

Salt Lake—I mean the State of Utah could then determine after

17

the final issue is resolved whether or not you should go

18

forward in West Valley or go forward by the State of Utah.

19

MR. JONES: Just—just so I understand.

20

This—West Valley and

Once we get

the remittitur, we may r£-file, is that—

21

THE COURT:

You may re-file—

22

MR. JONES: Thank you very much.

23

THE COURT:

24

MR, PETERSON:

25

MR. JONES: Thank you, Judge.

—once the remittitur i s —
Thank you very much, your Honor.

27

1

to allow the 8355 filing to stand,

2
3
4

THE COURT: Mr. Jones, do you want to respond to
that?
Mft, JONES: Well, yeah, I just—1 don't—I don't

5

think you can.

6

in April while we were waiting for the remittitur.

7

got word from the Court of Appeals that they were dismissing

8

the appeal, so we went ahead and re-filed.

9

that's still pending.

10

There's no question you dismissed the one case
Then we

That's the case

And what you said at that time is, it's okay to re-

11

file, but I'm going to hold the warrant until we get a

12

decision from the Court of Appeals, so that's essentially

13

where we are. And i f —

14
15

THE COURT: And that's the position the Court is
going to take in this matter.

16

MR. JONES: Okay.

17

THE COURT:

I'm not going to dismiss any more cases,

18

I'm not going to entertain any arguments on any cases until we

19

have the ^resolution on the appeals resolved; so, I don't want

20

to have cases set^in front of me again and arguments, because

21

I'm not going to hear them until I have a remittitur back from

22

the Court of Appeals.

23

MR. JONES:

Thanks, Judge.

24

MR. PETERSON:

25

THE COURT:

That's all I have, your Honor.

Thank you.

Supreine Court on the issue of the writ of certiorari there*

I

take it from Mr. Jones' approach with that order, that he's
asking the Court not to do anything•
THE COURT: Well, I don't think I can do anything,
Mr. Peterson*
MR. PETERSON:
THE COURT:

Yeah.

I think--*

I mean, that's the argument you'ye made

in front of me before is, is that—that since there's no
remittitur, I can't do anything*

Nowf I've got §n order from

the Court of Appeals saying they're staying remittitur•

I

don't think I can do anything*
MR. PETERSON: Well, that's—that's almost correct.
Actually, the first case, Judge, before you, ending in 5698,
we did ask you to dismiss without prejudice and you went ahead
and did that, based on the pending appeals process—appeals
process*

So, while your Honor is correct that we've used the

remittitur argument, we have asked you to proceed on the
narrow issues of jurisdiction and you have done that*
There's- a companion case, 8355, which has a
duplicate Information filed before your Hon6r to the
Information filed in 5698.

And consistent with what the Court

has done in the past, we would ask you to at least reach the
issue of out motioiii to dismiss without prejudice in 8355,
given that the appeals process is ongoing in the W£st Valley
prosecution and therefore, this Court is without jurisdiction

3

P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. PETERSON:

Judge r could we turn to the Richard

Norris case, please?
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. PETERSON:

Judge, did you receive a copy of the

latest order that came down from the Court of Appeals on this?
That's why we asked you t o — t o look at it now.

It just seems

to me in light of the ruling, we can't really proceed.
still waiting for the remittitur.

We're

They've now stayed it while

he goes to the U.S. Supreme Court, so...
It looks like the Utah Supreme Court denied his
petition on September 27th and then he went to the Court of
Appeals and—and indicated to them that he was going to
petition the U.S. Supreme Court.

And then I got that order

that I just gave you on the 2 9th or 30th, indicating they've
granted another stay so it can go to the U.S. Supreme Court.
THE COURT:

Very well.

So, I'll assume that based upon this, that if we
don't hear something from the U.S. Supreme Court, that on
December the 2 9th, unless there's something given to the Court
of Appeals, that we should hear from them after December the
29th; is that your understanding?
MR. PETERSON:

That's generally our understanding,

Judge, we would hear relatively soon from the United States

2

tf^^OOOo^to^
1

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE CITY

2

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3

-oOo-

4

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

5
6
7

Case No. 971008355

vs.

MOTION

RICHARD FRANKLIN NORRIS, JR
Defendant.

8

-oOo-

9
10

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 19th day of

11
12
13
14
15

November, 1997, the above-entitled matter came on for
hearing before the HONORABLE L.A. DEVER, sitting as Judge
in the above-named Court for the purpose of this cause,
and that the following proceedings were had.
-oOo-

16
17

For the State:

ERNIE JONES
Deputy Salt Lake County
District Attorney
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111

For the Defendant:

MICHAEL A. PETERSON
Attorney at Law
Salt Lake Legal Defender
Association
424 East 500 South, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111

18
19
20
21

FILES DISTHSCT C0UR1
Third Judicial District

22

E C - 2 20
23
24

M

FILED

SALT LAKE COUNTY

Utah Court of Appeals

Deputy Clerk

25

2 2 21
Paulette Stagg
rior|< of ths Court
ouri M

ALAN P SMITH, CSR

ORIGINAL

385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266 0320
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84107

£CD$tftn

m

Condenselt

STATE v . N O R M S , 971005698FS
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
*£i»w»*»»

Plaintiff,
Case No. 971005698FS

-vsRICHARD F. NORRIS,

HEARING, 12-4-98

Defendant.
\* J w*na* s?

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 4th day
of December, 1998, at 2-30 o'clock p m , this cause
came on for hearing before the HONORABLE LEE A
DEVER, District Court, without a "jury, in the Salt

FILED
Lake County Courthouse, Salt Lake City, Utah.

_UIAH_APP£LLATE COURTS

A P P E A R A N C E S :
For t h e

State:

ERNIE JONES
Attorney at Law

MAY 1 2 2004

16
17
18

For the Defendants:

Attorney a ^ L ^ j j ^ j g l

DlStfiCt

19
20

Court Transcriber:

BILLIE WAY, CCT

MAR 1 6 1999

21
22

By.

23

Page 1
PROCEEDINGS
THE COURT: Ready on the Norris matter?
This is on for the Defendant's motion to
dismiss this matter?
This is Case No. 9 8 - I mean, 978008355.
Now, Case No. 978008355 has been
dismissed; correct?
MR. PETERSON: Judge, it has been
dismissed on a motion that I made; however,
Mr. Norris subsequently filed a pro se motion to
dismiss with prejudice THE COURT: That's on the Case No. 5698?
MR. PETERSON: Correct. At which point
you considered his special motion to dismiss with
prejudice and for reappointment of counsel. You
granted his motion reappointing counsel on the narrow
issue of whether the case should be dismissed with
prejudice. So our posture on 5698 is: Should that
matter be dismissed with prejudice?
Our posture on 8355 is: Should the case
be dismissed? And then should it likewise be
dismissed with prejudice?
THE COURT: All right. That's your
understanding, Mr. Jones?
MR. JONES: Yeah, I guess. What I show

25

24
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Page 2
is that back on the 11th of April of 1997, you
dismissed the case. I got down that you dismissed
until the remittitur arrived.
MR. PETERSON: Well, when he says "the
case," I assume that's referring to 8355?
MR. JONES: I think SO.
THE COURT: There was a motion to dismiss
on this matter made on the 11th of — the 19th of
November, and I rejected that request and said, "That
the Court denies defense motion to dismiss, will
entertain no further motions, hearings or arguments
until the remittitur from the Court of Appeals."
MR. PETERSON: Right. And, Judge, as
I've corrected on the docket twice now, you didn't
rule legally one way or another on our motion to
dismiss. You simply said, T m not going to rule on
any motions until we have the appellate court process
run its course."
THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MR. PETERSON: So there hasn't been any
formal ruling one way or another on the motion to
dismiss with prejudice in 5698, and there hasn't been
any rulings at all on any motion to dismiss on 8355.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. PETERSON: Except for the ruling that
Page 3
you wouldn't rule until the appellate court ran its
course.
THE COURT: Okay. Very well. Let's
proceed.
MR. PETERSON: Thank you, Judge.
Your Honor, would it be all right if I
proceed from counsel table here. I have got a lot of
materials to spread out.
Judge, first, I guess, in order of
procedural tidiness, we've got 5698, which was the
first of the filings before you, and that's the
subject of THE COURT: That's not a filing. That's
not Judge Palmer's case?
MR. PETERSON: No, Judge, that's not
Judge Palmer's. That is the case filed immediately
after Judge Palmer's was dismissed.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. PETERSON: And that is the case that
you granted Mr. Norris the special right to reopen
the issue about dismissal with prejudice. You have
already dismissed the case without prejudice. The
reason you dismissed it without prejudice was the
filing in 5698 occurred before the remittitur from
the Utah Court of Appeals had come back in the case

'; rbatcorvrA
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1 of West Valley City v. Richard Norris.
1 because of a subsequent filing.
!2
Mr. Norrisf request to have the cas&
2
So we have filings in the downtown Third
3 dismissed with prejudice has three bases: Number
3 District Court that are essentially duplicates of a
4 one, Mr. Norris filed a pro se memorandum, asking you 4 West Valley case on appeal that keep landing my
5 to dismiss it because of what he outlined in his
5 client in jail. And he does a whole month of jail
6 Memorandum as what he termed prosecutorial
6 time in a case that both Your Honor and Judge Palmer
7 vindictiveness. And then I subsequently supplemented
7 did not hesitate to dismiss once the motions to
8 his memorandum with a letter dated June 3, 1997,
8 dismiss were filed.
9 which is in your file, and I attached copies of the
9
And, you know, Judge, Mr. Norris1 pro se
10 Der and the DeMarco Cases (phonetic) to supplement
10 memorandum, my reference to the Der and DeMarco Case
11 Mr. Norrisf pro se filing.
11 lays out an analysis that obligates the State to a
12
Your Honor, the gist of the argument here
12 higher standard. They know the appellate procedure,
13 that Mr. Norris advanced in his Memorandum and that 13 they know the West Valley case is pending and yet the
14 I've supplemented with the Der and DeMarco Cases is 14 man is jailed for an additional month on essentially
15 that he had been subjected to the prosecutorial
15 duplicate filings.
16 vindictiveness because the Judge Palmer filing in
16
So the long and the short of it is:
17 downtown court, a filing that was a duplicate of the
17 There's that prejudice, there's that vindictiveness
18 West Valley case with Judge Watson, was filed when
18 in the proceedings and Mr. Norris' pro se memorandum
19 Mr. Norrisf appeal was still pending. And everybody, 19 sets forth the relief there, which would be a
20 knew that the appeal was still pending, and so they
20 dismissal with prejudice Under those circumstances.
21 ought not to have gone forward with a duplicate
21
The second basis, Judge, for the
22 filing. The West Valley case was before the Utah
22 dismissal with prejudice in Case 5698 is, I think,
i23 Court of Appeals.
23 really the heart of what we are discussing here
24
Now, the prejudice here is that
24 today, an it's got a little bit of a procedural
25 Mr. Norris was, in fact, served with a new criminal
25 involvement to it, Judge. I filed the memorandum

Page 7
PageS5I
1 dated July 1st, 19 (Inaudible) so that the Court and
1 information, Judge; he was, in fact, incarcerated on
2 that new filing while the appeal was pending.
2 Mr. Jones know what I'm referring to. It's entitled
3
THE COURT: And I dismissed it based upon
3 Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to
4 his motion.
4 Dismiss with Prejudice. The argument there, Judge,
5
THE COURT: Judge, I'm talking about
5 is that an expungement order was in place. After
6 Judge Palmer's case that you never dealt with. He
6 Judge Palmer's case had been dismissed, Your Honor,
7 spent three weeks in jail in the Judge Palmer case
7 there had been an expungement order sought by
8 before he posted $40,000 in bail and got out. That
8 Mr. Norris' and subsequently signed.
9 case was subsequently dismissed. Judge Palmer
9
Now, I need to make a correction on the
10 dismissed that matter saying, "State, don't be filing
10 record, Judge. It was signed by Mr. Judge Hilder,
11 actions when there is an appeal in the same case out
11 and it was not signed by Judge Palmer as indicated in
12 of West Valley pending."
12 my memorandum. And I correct that typo. But the
13 point being that the expungement order was signed by
13
All right. Now, Judge Palmer's case was
14 Judge Hilder, and the effect of the expungement order
14 dismissed. Your case, your first case is filed;
15 under the statute is that all records of the
15 that's 5698. Once again, Mr. Norris is
16 investigation, arrest and detention of an individual
16 incarcerated. I filed a motion to dismiss because
17 are are expunged and are sealed and cannot be used
17 the West Valley appeal is still pending even the
18 for any further purposes. And I cite and attach the
18 second time that the downtown case is filed. You
19 case of Ambis v. Utah State Board of Education
19 look at the matter and say, "Sure enough. We don't
20 (phonetic) to my memorandum which holds exactly
20 have a remittitur in the case. The State is on
21 that. The police records, hospital records and
21 notice that remittitur is what turns an appellate
22 witness testimony in that case, once an expungement
22 case back to a state court, and therefore this case
23 order had been executed, were sealed and were not
23 will have to be dismissed.
24 available for any use in any prosecution or any other
24
All right. Unfortunately, Mr. Norris had
25 court action.
25 another week — roughly a little over a week in jail
BILLIE WAY, CCT 801-364-4943
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J1
So, Judge, there is an expungement order
1 case.
2 in effect. Judge Hilder signed the expungement
2
MR. PETERSON: Judge, the expungement
3 order certainly has its own individual case number,
3 order. Those records are sealed. They can't form
4 but the records that are sealed by that expungement
4 the basis for any additional affiant in a probable
5 order, as indicated in the memorandum and
5 cause statement of an information to go forward with
6 attachments, are the records that underpin the Judge
6 any additional criminal filings. And that order has
7
Palmer probable cause filing. Once the Judge Palmer
7 not been overturned. In other words, as we stand
1
8 case has been dismissed, Mr. Norris sought
8 here today, Your Honor, Judge Hilder s order stands.
9
expungement of that particular case that had just
9 It's never been appealed by the State. It's never
10 been dismissed. Now, the statute allows an
10 been an issue of a motion for rehearing before Judge
11 individual to have a case that's been dismissed
11 Hilder to seek that the order be overturned.
12 expunged, and that's exactly what Mr. Norris did.
12
In Mr. Jonesf reply memorandum, Your
13 Mr. Jones argues that he didn't either follow the
13 Honor, on this expungement issue, the argument is
14 right procedure or that Judge Hilder didn't have the
14 made on the bottom of Page 3 and I quote:
15 right information before him to sign the order, but
15
"The expungement order should
16 the order is in place. And what I'm submitting to
16
not have been granted."
17 you, Judge, is since the records that were sealed are
17
That's the State's rationale for why you
18 the basis for the probable cause underpinning the
18 ought not to abide by it But it is an order entered
19 Judge Palmer filing and two subsequent filings in
19 by the Court of a competent and coequal jurisdiction
20
your case, the Judge that needs to take a look at
20 to your own. And I submit, Judge, what we have on
21 lifting the expungement order is Judge Hilder unless
21 our hands is, in essence, a variation of a Brickey
22 you believe you're able to sit in a capacity to
22 issue. As you are aware, in the standard Brickey
23 review and potentially overturn your colleague's
23 analysis if a case goes to some form of hearing, in
24 order. And that's why it's a Brickey issue.
24 this case in an expungement case an ex parte hearing,
25
THE COURT: I guess, you can sit this in
25 and an order is signed by a Judge, the way you look
Page 11
Page 9
1 front of Judge Hilder and have him look at this.
1 at analyzing whether the order ought to be overturned
2
MR. PETERSON: I guess we could.
2 or in some other way altered is you take that issue
3 back to the Judge that issued the order.
3
THE COURT: And he could say that we have
4 a statement here supposedly made under oath by
4
Now, this isn't a procedural snafu that
5 Mr. Norris that appears not to be true.
5 Mr. Jones and I have discussed before today, and,
6
MR. PETERSON: We can certainly do that
6 frankly, this concept of the Brickey analysis was
j
7
if
there
were either an order from Your Honor
7 just coming to me while I was eating lunch today, but
8 the point is this, Judge: The State is asking you to
I 8 transferring these issues to Judge Hilder or a
9 override Judge Hilderrs expungement order when they
9 special petition by the State to reopen that issue
10 ask you to ignore it, when they argue, "It should
10 with Judge Hilder. But to date we don't have either
11 never have been granted.11
II of those filings or orders.
12
THE COURT: I don't have a copy of an
12
But, Judge, my point is: The expungement
13 expungement order, either.
13 statute has been complied with. There is an
14
MR. PETERSON: It is attached, Your
14 expungement in place. And if the State wants it
15 Honor, to the supplemental memorandum. And I111
115 overturned, they either have to go on direct appeal
16 provide you with my copy of that so you can look at
16 to a higher court or go back before Judge Hilder on a
17 i t
17 special petition to have it overridden.
18
Your Honor, may I approach.
18
Now, Your Honor, the third basis for the
19
THE COURT: Uh-huh.
19 motion to dismiss is that this particular
20
MR. PETERSON: (Handing). What I've
20 Communications Fraud statute is unconstitutional on
121 attached is Exhibit B to my initial memorandum is the 21 its face. And I have elaborated in detail —
22 Judge Hilderfs January 27th, 1997, expungement order 22
THE COURT: I have read through that
|23 sealing all records.
23 previously. You don't have to argue that.
24
THE COURT: Well, that doesn't apply to
24
MR. PETERSON: Right. I will make one
25 either of these two cases, though. This is a third
25 rebuttal point about it once Mr. Jones has touched on
|
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! 1 that issue.
1 it is our position that he lied in order to get those
2
MR. JONES: Judge, I think the issue here
2 records expunged. I mean, one of the paragraphs in
3 is pretty simple, and I think the statute that we
3 his petition, Paragraph 7, he claims that there were
4 cited in our supplemental memorandum is right on
4 no charges pending and no investigation being
5 point. The question, I think, is whether the State
5 instituted when, in fact, at the time that he files
6 is entitled to refile charges that have been
6 his petition this case, or at least the subject
7 dismissed. In this case they have been dismissed on
7 matter of this case, was on appeal to the Court of
8 two prior occasions.
8 Appeals. He knew that, and yet he goes ahead and
9
I cited to the Court Rule 7 of the Utah
9 files his petition. Under 77-18-12 it specifically
10 Rules of Criminal Procedure, and it's Section 7,
10 provides that you cannot have your records expunged
11 Subparagraph H3, where it says:
II if, in fact, there are charges pending or an
n
12
The dismissal and discharge in
12 investigation pending, and that's exactly what
13
a preliminary hearing do not preclude
13 happened?
14
the State from instituting a
14
THE COURT: Well, in this matter here it
15
subsequent prosecution for the same
15 seems to me that it is clear that the petition filed
16
offense."
16 by Mr. Norris in this matter, all he asked is to
17
And I really think that's the situation
17 expunge his arrest and detention records. It doesn't
18 we are dealing with here. And I'm not sure it's
18 say anything else about it.
19 necessary to talk about all of the reasoning by Judge
19
MR. JONES: That's right. And I don't
20 Palmer or yourself when you dismissed this because
20 think the expungement record really means anything as
21 the remittitur was not here. I think the statute is
21 far as the method or means to preclude us from
22 fairly clear that we are entitled to refile criminal
22 refiling criminal charges.
23 charges under Rule 7H3. If you want I'll be glad
23
THE COURT: I don't understand what
24 to 24 section of the Code he's talking about (Inaudible)
25
THE COURT: what about their argument
25 77-18 (Inaudible) cited all through this whole thing
Page 15
Page 13
j 1 has been repealed and has been repealed since 1994.
1 that since this was expunged, that you can't do
2
MR. JONES: Right. I would simply just
2 anything?
3 ask the Court to allow us to refile based on Rule 7
3
MR. JONES: Well, Judge, the reason that
4 and deny the motion.
4 I don't think the expungement statute applies is
5
THE COURT: Mr. Peterson.
5 expungement deals with the arrest records. What he
6
MR. PETERSON: Thank you, Your Honor. We
6 was doing there is expunging his arrest record. That
7 refer to 77-18-1 eq seq and particularly the
7 does not preclude, and it is certainly not
8 definition contained at 77-18-9 where it says that,
8 appropriate as a method to preclude, the State from
9 "Expungement means the sealing or destruction of a
9 refiling. If it were, then why would we have Rule
10 criminal record and including records of all
10 7H3 which says specifically that the State may refile
11 investigation, arrests, detention or conviction."
11 charges? So, I mean, if the expungement statute is
12 All records of investigation, Judge.
12 there and designed to preclude us from ever refiling,
13
THE COURT: Yes, that may be true, but he
13 every defendant who prevailed in a preliminary
14 hearing would simply file for an expungement. If you 14 didn't ask for that. All he asked for was his
15 detention records to be expunged, and that's
15 look at the expungement statute, it has to do with
16 (Inaudible) How can you argue that the State has an
16 his arrest record, or there is another section that
17 obligation to oppose something that he's not even
17 deals with expunging convictions. But the
18 asking for?
18 expungement statute is not designed to prevent us
19
MR. PETERSON: Judge, my opinion of Judge
19 from refiling criminal charges. It simply prevents
20 Hilder's expungement order is that he did, in fact,
20 us — or expunges his record as to a particular
21 seal consistent with the definition of expungement
21 arrest in this case. And that's why we didn't bother
22 under Subsection 9, that he did seal all of the
22 to ever challenge his expungement petition, because
23 criminal record and investigation and arrest and
23 as I read it, it doesn't preclude us from refiling
24 detention records.
24 criminal charges.
25
Now, everything that Mr. Jones says in
25
As we outlined in our initial memorandum,
BILLIE W A Y , CCT 801-364-4943
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1 rebuttal m a y , in fact, be true, b u t these are
2 arguments that need to be submitted to the court that
3 issued the expungement order.
4
THE COURT: No, I d o n ' t think so. I
5 think y o u can read through the request that —
6
MR. PETERSON: Judge, m a y I retrieve m y
7 m e m o r a n d u m because obviously I can't (Inaudible).
8
THE COURT: I d o n ' t k n o w w h y w e d o n ' t
9 have copies of those things in the file.
TO
MR. PETERSON: Judge, specifically,
11 Subparagraph 1 of Judge Hilder's January 21st, ' 9 7 ,
12 order reads that, "All records in Petitioner's case
13 in this court or any other court of this county shall
14 b e expunged and sealed." A n d w e are dealing with all
\ 15 records under the Code including any records of
116 investigation that w o u l d form the basis for the
17 probable cause statement.
118
THE COURT: I understand your argument,
19 b u t I a m saying if y o u read Mr. N o r r i s ' request to
20 h i m a n d the request that he sends to the prosecutor,
21 he asks for the expungement of his arrest and
22 detention records. I mean, I don't think h e ' s
23 entitled to any m o r e than what h e ' s asked for. So
24 I'll deny your motion.
25
MR. PETERSON: Well, Judge, I
1
2
3
4
5
6

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
118
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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THE COURT: But your argument doesn't
m a k e any difference what the person says. H e doesn't
m a r k down that he wants the records expunged. H e
only wants the arrest records taken care of. A n d
that therefore because he didn't ask for it, the
State didn't object to it, they are bound for
something that he didn't even ask for?
MR. PETERSON: Judge, if w e review ~
THE COURT: Is that what y o u are saying?
MR. PETERSON: Judge, just one moment.
If w e j u s t review... Your Honor, w h a t ' s m a r k e d in the
Petitioner's Petition for Expungement as seen in the
records is Subsection 6, "expunging all of the
arrests, detention records."
THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MR. PETERSON: All of the records
pertaining THE COURT: (Inaudible).
MR. PETERSON: Pertaining to Mr. N o r r i s '
arrest are exactly the records referred to in the
definition of expungement. A l l of the records of
investigation that led up to that arrest, all of the
records underpinning probable cause in the arrest.
Arrest records, in short, is anything having to do
with what led u p to that arrest. A n d our position -

Page 19
Page 17
1
THE COURT: (Inaudible).
u n d e r s t a n d - I guess that y o u have ruled on this
2
MR. PETERSON: Well, I a m not coming up
issue. But I want to b e clear for any appellate
3 with this. The legislature defined expungement quite
record that Judge Hilder's order is using definition
of expungement found at 77-18-9, Subsection 5.
4 clearly so that w e w o u l d n ' t be in this b o x . A n d
THE COURT: (Inaudible) argue that. Y o u
5 Judge Hilder has signed an expungement order. So I
can say that's what it says. Y o u can argue that
6 think w e are treading on some thin ice and some
7 delicate ground without having Judge Hilder revisit
that's what it should say, but I don't think I'm
going t o stand here and interpret what Judge Hilder's
8 the issue and tell u s what he believes the scope of
signed and what the statute says. It is not for m e
9 the order that he signed w a s and whether it ought to
to decide.
10 be an order that should b e revisited and perhaps
MR. PETERSON: Well, it would b e
11 withdrawn. I mean, I think there are some very
something for Judge Hilder to decide, however, and
12 serious due process issues that creep in n o w under a
that's w h y it becomes a delicate Brickey issue. I
13 Brickey analysis.
mean, there are fine-tuned rulings that are m a d e , for
14
THE COURT: Underneath Subsection 9, it
example, at preliminary hearing that only the Judge
15 says: "Expungement means the sealing or destruction
sitting in those proceedings can revisit. A n d this
16 of a criminal record including records of
is one such ruling that needs a revisiting in m y
17 investigation restitution or conviction" (Inaudible).
opinion. Because the statute is clear, the
18
MR. PETERSON: Right.
legislature has defined that when an expungement
19
THE COURT: It seems to m e it can be any
order is issued here is what is covered. I t ' s
20 one of those or something else. It d o e s n ' t have to
categorical and it is black and white. A n
21 mean all of those.
expungement order has been signed, and all records
22
MR. PETERSON: Right. A n d m y point is
under 77-18-9, Subsection 5 are covered b y virtue of
23 that this order is broad enough that when it says
the statutory definition once the expungement order
24 "records of arrest," it can include records
is issued.
25 supporting probable cause that led t o the arrest;
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1

In any event, Judge, it just seems to me

2 that if it is an order imposed b y a coequal court or
| 3 of coequal jurisdiction, perhaps that Judge ought to
j 4 b e looking at this issue, and I w a n t to m a k e this
5 Court aware that I believe that w o u l d b e the
6 procedurally proper thing to do even if w e e n d u p
7 with exactly the same result, that the motion to
8 dismiss is denied on the basis of the expungement

9 statute.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

THE COURT: (Inaudible).
MR. PETERSON: Now, Judge, in response t o
M r . Jones' response, h e argues that 7H(3), the
State's right to refile, s o m e h o w covers everything.
Well, w e h a v e n ' t addressed the issue of the
constitutionality of the statute. Certainly, the
State d o e s n ' t have the right to refile if a motion to
dismiss with prejudice is granted. T h e y only have

18 the right to refile if it's a motion ~ if it is a
19
20
21
22
j 23
24
25

dismissal without prejudice. W e also d o n ' t have any
response from M r . Jones about the p r o se arguments of
M r . Norris on vindictiveness a n d the jailing of h i m
twice and the one m o n t h in jail when both Y o u r H o n o r
a n d Judge Palmer dismissed those actions saying,
"Wait a minute. A p p e a l s are pending. D o n ' t b e
doing this." A n d the State is silent on those issues

1
2
3
4
5

1 as far as I can tell here.

5
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7
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22
23
24
25

1
2
| 3
4
Prosecution's part. If you look, initially, we
j5
6
outlined our first m e m o r a n d u m of h o w this case c a m e
7
into play. Originally the West Valley Police were
8
told b y Judge Watson that these charges needed to b e
9
filed as felonies. H e dismissed the case out there,
10
and that's the one that went u p on appeal. A n d so
11
the police came to o u r office a n d said, " W e have been
12
told b y Judge W a t s o n that these charges involving
Communications F r a u d should b e filed as felonies. W e 13
14
filed those."
15
W h e n w e got in front of Judge Palmer, he
16
m a d e it clear that he w a s going to quash the
17
information because the appeal w a s still pending.
18
B u t he also said that once the appeal w a s over, then
19
w e could go ahead and refile. A n d w e were notified
20
b y the Court of Appeals that the appeal h a d been
21
dismissed and that w e were then free to go ahead and
22
file. So there's nothing vindictive. W e h a d
23
instructions from Judge Palmer at that time saying,
24
" Y o u can go ahead and refile this case once the
25
appeal has been dismissed," a n d that's w h a t w e did.
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A n d then the next time it came u p , of course, w a s in
front of Y o u r Honor where w e h a d refiled the charges,
b u t w e h a d not received the remittitur. A n d y o u said
essentially the same thing, " I ' m going to dismiss the
case b u t y o u can refile once y o u get the

6 remittitur."

Page 21
2
THE COURT: Mr. Jones.
3
MR. JONES: Well, Judge, I can respond.
4 This is not a case of vindictiveness at all on the

HEARING, 12-4-98

So w e are simply following instructions
that have been given to u s b y t w o different Judges
saying, " Y o u can file these charges once the appeal
is over or once the remittitur comes back." So this
is not a situation where w e are being vindictive. W e
are simply following the instructions of the Court.
A n d that's w h y w e never bothered to respond to the
expungement request because in reality w e have got
instructions from t w o different Judges telling u s
when and under what conditions or circumstances w e
can go ahead a n d refile.
THE COURT: (Inaudible) I ' l l deny the
motion to dismiss with prejudice i n the Case N o .
5698. T h e case has been dismissed. In Case N o .
9 7 1 0 0 8 3 5 5 , I'll deny your motion t o dismiss in that
matter, as well.
MR. PETERSON: Judge, there are separate
issues in 8355 relative to the dismissal without
prejudice. A n d , b y the w a y , m a y I approach, Judge?
Page 2 3
I do have — when you handed me back my expungement
memo, you also handed me the initial memo I filed
(Handing).
Your Honor, by point of clarification, I
take it your ruling is that the statute is not
unconstitutional?
THE COURT: On the vagueness matter?
MR. PETERSON: Right.
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. PETERSON: okay. Judge, did you want
to entertain any argument at all on that issue do you
think?
THE COURT: No, I believe it's outlined
clearly by both sides in the memorandums, and I have
read through that, and I believe that the State's
position is correct.
MR. PETERSON: okay. I would point out
then, again, for purposes of appeal that the State's
example at the end of their memorandum on Pages 3 and
4 is an example that clearly displays why the statute
it unconstitutional. Mr. Jones cites a case where if
you have communications with ten people and in each
of those communications you obtain a hundred dollars
each, then you have ten separate acts of
Communications Fraud.
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Page 2 4
THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MR. PETERSON: But y o u also have a felony
because first y o u count them ten times a n d then y o u
aggregate it. Well, you can't have it both ways,
Judge. The statute either has to allow an
aggregation of the s u m of a t h o u s a n d dollars in order
to get you a felony level scheme or it has to break
it down as ten separate m i s d e m e a n o r offenses at a
hundred dollars each. And the very — the very
example that Mr. Jones articulates is the one that
points most clearly to why the statute is facially
unconstitutional.
And, procedurally, Judge, let's be clear
where this case came from: Keith Stoney (phonetic)
was Prosecutor in West Valley City that brought the
action. And he said to Judge Watson, "Judge, I get
to file ten separate misdemeanors if they are each a
hundred dollar communications," and Judge Watson
said, "No, you have to aggregate it as one felony."
Mr. Stoney filed an appeal saying, "No, no no. Every
separate" —
THE COURT: (Inaudible) that appeal w a s
dismissed.
MR. PETERSON: I understand. l a m
telling you what he briefed. "Every separate

1
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communication is a separate misdemeanor." That's how 1 in 8355 strongly the State felt in Judge Watson's court.
2
THE COURT: The appeal is n o t pending
THE COURT: (Inaudible) M r . Stoney.
3 anymore in this case.
MR. PETERSON: I understand. B u t the
4
MR. PETERSON: It is n o t a n y m o r e and so
point is Judge Watson in that case, in a case that is
5 it can be filed now.
sort of coequal law of the case, ruled it's one or
6
THE COURT: (Inaudible) filed, okay? It
another. Either y o u aggregate it as a single felony
7 is filed effective this date, is that what you are
offense or y o u have ten separate m i s d e m e a n o r s at a
j 8 saying?
hundred dollars each. And he dismissed the case and
j9
MR. PETERSON: Well, if that's what you'd
said, "Go refile as one felony."
110 like to rule. B u t the appeal w a s pending when 8355
Well, Mr. Jones' example is: You either
111 was filed.
have the ten misdemeanors at a hundred or you have
12
THE COURT: And so w h a t are y o u saying?
one felony at a thousand. But you don't have ten
13
MR. PETERSON: Well, I'm saying that, you
separate felonies because s o m e h o w the ten
j 14 know, it wasn't properly filed because the appeal was
communcations added up to 1,000. That's his argument 115 still underway at the time. And the appeal process
here.
16 has run its course, the matter can be filed. But it
THE COURT: The statute says, "Each
17 couldn't on the date 8355 was actually filed.
separate communication is a separate act or offense."
18
THE COURT: It's properly before m e n o w ;
MR. PETERSON: It does.
19 is it not?
THE COURT: That's quoting f r o m y o u r
20
MR. JONES: if the State files it as of
(Inaudible).
21 today.
MR. PETERSON: Well, t h a t ' s w h a t t h e
22
MR. JONES: We filed back i n M a y 2 2 n d of
statute says.
23 1997,1 believe. That's the latest one. And what
THE COURT: And the other part of the
24 happened was we filed it and the Court said, "You can
statute says that the determination of the degree of
25 file the information, but we'll take it under
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any offense shall be measured by the total value of
things to b e obtained b y the scheme, and the scheme
is all of these separate communications.
MR. PETERSON: Right.
THE COURT: That is the interpretation
that's been given.
MR. PETERSON: Right.
THE COURT: And therefore if the total
amount is a felony, then each one of these separate
communications is also a felony.
MR. PETERSON: And y o u are saying that
that's constitutional on its face?
THE COURT: Right.
MR. PETERSON: I see.
THE COURT: Anything further?
MR. JONES: I think the next thing is w e
need set a p r e l i m if w e can.
MR. PETERSON: Well, Judge, w e do have
the dismissal on Case 8355 with and without
prejudice. I know you've ruled that with prejudice
won't be granted because the expungement doesn't bar,
the statute is constitutional a n d the vindictiveness
hasn't been shown. But in 8355 we have the same
basis for a dismissal in the case that we have in
5698, that is an appeal is pending. It's simply that
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[ 1 advisement for the time being until the appeal is
1
THE COURT: Well, Mr. Jones, do you want
2 to say anything?
I 2 resolved."
3
THE COURT: Well, it's filed when it is
3
MR. JONES: Well, Judge, in our
4 filed. The appeal has been resolved. I believe it's
4 memorandum we have outlined the factual scenario that
5 properly before the Court.
5 took place here, and what I have down on our second
6
MR. PETERSON: Judge, as of what
6 page, Number 7, Paragraph No. 7, is on April 11th,
7 effective date is it properly before the Court?
7 1997, you dismissed the felony charges because the
8 Because when it was filed, the appeal was still
8 remittitur had not been issued by the Court of
9 pending in the West Valley case. And you dismissed
9 Appeals. You advised the parties that charges could
10 5698 for that singular reason. You said, "Don't be
10 be filed once the remittitur arrived from the Court
II filing anything until the appeals are done." 8355 was
11 of Appeals. A month later in May of'97 the District
12 filed before the appeals were done.
12 Attorney's Office received the remittitur from the
13
THE COURT: Well (Inaudible).
13 Court of Appeals and filed felony charges. Those
14
MR. JONES: Let's be clear, Judge. What
14 charges are currently pending, but Your Honor had
15 you said was that we couldn't file until the
15 recalled the arrest warrant until the motion to
16 remittitur came back. Once we got the remittitur
16 dismiss could be resolved. The Defendant has filed a
17 back, that's when we filed this latest case in May of
17 motion to dismiss the case with prejudice. That's
18 '97. My recollection is that as soon as we filed,
18 the one we just argued (Inaudible).
19
So it just seems to me that there's no
19 then Mr. Norris turned around and petitioned to the
20 question we can file the charges. We have done
J20 U.S. Supreme Court.
21 that. The remittitur came back. What stopped us
|21
THE COURT: I don't think there's
22 after that point in time in May of '97 is that he
22 anything that says that they can't file an
23 then petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to put us back
123 information. I think that if there is an issue
24 on hold. Because even though the remittitur had been
24 concerning whether or not it is properly before the
25 issued, they recalled the remittitur later on because
25 Court because of an appeal, there may be hearings on
Page 29
1 that that can be stayed. I think that's what I said,
2 that I am not going to dismiss this or entertain any
3 further motions until the remittitur is received.
4 The remittitur has been received, so I think it's
5 properly before the Court. I don't think there's
6 anything that says they can't file it. Therefore
7 it's properly before the Court.
8
MR. PETERSON: Well, Judge, what we had
9 briefed the first time you issued your order
10 dismissing the case was the concept that you can't
11 file one set of charges when that same set of charges
12 is pending a duplicate filing on appeal. And so you
13 didn't have hesitation dismissing 5698 on that basis
14 on essentially a double-jeopardy analysis basis. And
15 the same thing applies in 8355, there was a
16 remittitur from our State Supreme Court, a subsequent
17 filing with the U.S. Supreme Court in West Valley v.
18 Norris, and the case was still on active appeal until
19 the United States Supreme Court issued its denial and
20 remittitur. Once that occurs, then clearly West
21 Valley v. Norris is over and 8355 can be filed. But
22 the law we cited in our initial motion to dismiss
23 which you granted is that you cannot have duplicate
24 filings with the same charges when the first case is
25 on appeal.
BILLIE WAY, CCT 801-364-4943
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1 his case had gone up on appeal to the U.S. Supreme
I 2 Court.
3
THE COURT: okay. The remittitur was
4 issued and (Inaudible) in May 15th. May 15th and
5 that's the date this case was filed.
6
MR. JONES: Right. That is the date the
7 warrant was signed (Inaudible).
8
THE COURT: That's (Inaudible). I'll set
9 this matter for preliminary hearing at this time?
10
MR. JONES: That would be fine.
11
THE COURT: How much time do we need to
12 do this?
13
MR. JONES: Judge, I think we probably
14 ought to have a special setting if we can. We
15 probably got anywhere between eight and ten
16 witnesses. It shouldn't take longer than
17 (Inaudible).
18
THE COURT: February the 3rd?
19
MR. JONES: That's fine with the State.
20

THE COURT: 10:00 o'clock?

21
MR. PETERSON: Excuse me, Judge, what 22 which day of the week is that?
23
THE COURT: Wednesday.
24
MR. PETERSON: That will be fine. Did
25 you say 9:00 o'clock?
Page 2 8 - P a g e 31
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1 been previously booked and held for three weeks in
THE COURT: 10:00 o'clock.
2 the Judge Palmer matter, booked and held an
MR. PETERSON: 10:00 o'clock. That would
3 additional over one week in your case, 5698.
be here?
I4
MR. JONES: But he had that expunged, so
THE COURT: It's a special setting. If
J 5 there is no record of it.
for some reason you are not going to go, please
J6
MR. PETERSON: He doesn't have 5698
notify the Court.
; 7 expunged. That still stands.
MR. JONES: Judge, the only other
8
THE COURT: He has been booked on 5698,
question, I guess, to resolve is the question
9 and he doesn't need to be booked again on it.
involving the warrant of arrest that was issued. As
10
MR. PETERSON: That's our position.
I recall, Judge Reece recalled the warrant until we
II
THE
COURT: Well, he has to be. He has
resolved these issues involving the motion to
12 to be.
dismiss. I would simply ask the Court to allow us to
13
MR. PETERSON: That's what I say-activate the warrant, go ahead and have it served.
14
THE COURT: They say he has been and you
THE COURT: He'll just be booked and
15 say he hasn't been.
released?
16
MR. PETERSON: Well, he has been on 5698,
MR. JONES: Well, if I might, Judge,
17 and it has not been expunged. Mr. Jones doesn't
since this case was filed in May of 1997, this
18 contest that.
Defendant has been charged in at least four
19
MR. JONES: Right. What I am saying is:
additional cases. And I just think that he's a real
20 It is not a question of his appearance. It is a
threat to the community and we should certainly be
21 question of him being a threat to the community.
entitled to serve the warrant and have him booked on
the case. He's pending Communications Fraud cases or 22 What I've outlined to the Court are incidents where
charges down in Utah County. He was convicted up in 23 he's been arrested or charged with new crimes, and
24 that's our concern and the reason why we are asking
Davis County on Child Abuse. He had two cases
25 the Court to activate the warrant and that he booked
pending here in Salt Lake within the last year
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1 involving criminal mischief and violations of a
2 protective order. And I think primarily because of
3 his arrest record it's not inappropriate at least to
4 have a warrant served and have him booked.
5
THE COURT: I think he should be booked
6 and then he can be released.
7
MR. PETERSON: Judge, to simplify the
8 matter, the statute does allow under Rule 6 for a
9 simple appearance by summons. And I would ask the
10 Court to look at doing that simply because Mr. Norris
11 has made all court dates in this matter and in every
12 other matter that was ever filed. And I did
13 represent him in one previous — in one supplemental
14 downtown case with Mr. Jones where he made all
15 appearances before Judge McCleve. The case was
16 ultimately resolved and dismissed. And he's not
17 involved in any ongoing artifice or scheme in this
18 case or in the case that Mr. Grey of the Attorney
19 General's Office has filed.
20
THE COURT: He's never been actually
21 booked on this case; has he?
22
MR. JONES: That's right.
23
THE COURT: Doesn't the statute say he
24 has to have some sort of booking on felony charges?
25
MR. PETERSON: Well, he has, in fact,
BILLIE W A Y , CCT 801-364-4943
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1 in on this.
2
THE COURT: I deny the request.
3
MR. JONES: What do you want to do with
4 the arrest warrant, then, Judge?
5
THE COURT: Well, he's already been
6 booked on it.
J7
MR. JONES: He has not been booked on
| 8 this case.
| 9
THE COURT: You just told me he has 110
MR. PETERSON: On 5698 he has.
11
MR. JONES: No. This warrant is
i 12 791008355. He has never been booked on this case.
113
THE COURT: He has not been booked on
J14 this case, then he needs to be booked on this case
15 and released.
116
MR. PETERSON: Unless you allow him to
17 appear by summons.
18
THE COURT: I am going to have him booked
19 on it because on felony cases I believe he should be
20 booked on felony cases. So he can be booked and
21 released.
22
MR. PETERSON: okay. Judge, I want to
23 bring to your attention that what Mr. Jones said
24 about the initial remittitur is correct, but I do
25 need to make a record for appellate purposes. The
Page 32 - Page 35
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TRANSCRIBER'S CERTIFICATE
1 remittitur that came from the Utah Supreme Court was,
2 in fact, recalled. The May 1997 remittitur was
STATE OF UTAH
)
3 recalled by order and subsequently there was —
3
) ss.
4
THE COURT: When was it recalled?
4 County of SALT LAKE )
5
MR. PETERSON: It was recalled on June
5
6 30th of'97.
6
I, BiLLE WAY, CCT, do hereby certify that I
7
THE COURT: It was issued, the State
7 am a Certified Court Transcriber in and for the State
8 filed and after they filed it was recalled; is that
8 of Utah;
9 the correct actual scenario?
9
That I reduced the proceedings aforesaid to
10
MR. JONES: That's correct, Judge.
10 print from videotape to the best of my ability;
11
THE COURT: I understand that. And it is
11
I further certify that I have no interest in
12 properly filed (Inaudible).
12 the event of this action.
13
MR. JONES: Thanks, Judge.
13
WITNESS MY HAND this the 15th day of March,
14
MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, what do you
14 1999.
15 want to do procedurally in terms of the book and
16 release process? When will you allow Mr. Norris to
17
BIELIEWAY.CCT
Q
17 go and submit himself —
18
18
THE COURT: I have (Inaudible) here that
19
19 you can take him —
20
Billie Way is a Certified Court Transcriber
20
MR. PETERSON: Well - but he has some
2 1 working under my direction,
21 affairs to take care of. I mean, he has made all
22
22 appearances, Judge.
23
THE COURT: (Inaudible) do it now and get
24 it over with.
Carlton Way, CSR
25
MR. PETERSON: okay. May I have just one
25
Page 37
1 moment?
2
(Discussion off the record.)
3
MR. PETERSON: Judge, the subsequent
4 issue on that is if you are allowing booking him in
5 this process, the warrant is $150,000. If you are
6 saying that he has to be booked and then released, or
7 that language needs to be stricken by your order and
8 some sort of an interlineation from you.
THE COURT: Okay.
9
MR.
PETERSON: Thank you (Inaudible).
10
THE COURT: You are welcome.
11
We will be in recess.
12
(Hearing adjourned.)
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
BILLIE W A Y , CCT 801-364-4943
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Addendum C

DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
ERNEST W.JONES, 1736
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801-363-7900

FILED BIS

I T COURT

Third Judk ^'District

APR 18 1999
SALT LAKE COUNTY

*

-

^

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

AMENDED
INFORMATION

-vsRICHARD F. NORRIS
DOB 5/15/55

Case No. 971008355FS

Defendant.
The undersigned Ernest W. Jones, Deputy District Attorney, under oath states on
information and belief that the defendant committed the crime of:
COUNT I
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993^ in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Joan Mattson money or anything of value by means of
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
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COUNT II
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Joan Mattson money or anything of value by means of
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT III
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain Mike Mabry money or anything of value by means of false
of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a
party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for
the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of the
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT IV
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Mike Mabry money or anything of value by means of
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
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COUNT V
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Utley money or anything of value by means of
false offraudulentpretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT VI
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Utley money or anything of value by means of
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT VII
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Chris Atkin money or anything of value by means of
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
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COUNT VIII
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Chris Atkin money or anything of value by means of
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT IX
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Joy Slotsvic money or anything of value by means of
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT X
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Joy Slotsvic money or anything of value by means of
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
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COUNT XI
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Sue Hunter money or anything of value by means of
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT XII
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Sue Hunter money or anything of value by means of
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.

THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING
WITNESSES:
Officer Brook Plotnick, Officer Steve Humphrey, B. Gessel, Joan Mattson, Sue Hunter,
Kay Crosby, Mike Mabry, L. Stauffer, Kay Utley, S. Francis, O. Fowler, K. Noland, D.
Duffin and S. Labaron.

PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
Your affiant bases this Information on police report no. 94-25376 and the following:
1.
During the spring of 1993, the defendant ran an advertisment in the newspaper.
The ad made certain promises and representations to those responding concerning employment
and salary. Numerous people responded to the ad and met with the defendant. The defendant
had each person sign an agreement with him. The defendant did not deliver as promised. The
defendant then sued each person for over $1,000.00 and obtaine djudgments against many of
these people.

2.
The defendant told several employees at his business that he never intended to
fulfill any of the promises in the ad. The defendant back dated checks and altered records to
cover up this scheme.
I
^%^-^r

ERNESf W. JONES
Affiant
Subscribed and/^^gpttj
day of April, W$h

is/fe-

MAGISTRAT
Authorized for presentment and filing:
DAVID E. YOCOM, District Attorney
^/£S>ISL^

Ovi-s^

Deputy District Attprney
amended April 5,1999
msw/97006614
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Utah Court of Appeal*

This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Pauiette Stagg
Cterk of the Court
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OPINION
(For Official Publication)

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Case No. 20000202-CA
F I L E D
(September 26, 2002)

Richard F. Norris,
2002 UT App 305
Defendant and Appellant.

Third District, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Robiit W. Reese
Attorneys:

Sharon L. Preston, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Mark L. Shurtleff and Kris C. Leonard, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee

Before Judges Jackson, Davis, and Orme.
JACKSON, Presiding Judge:
^[l
Richard Norris appeals his sentence entered pursuant to
conditional pleas of guilty to two counts of communications
fraud, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-10-1801(1) (1995).
BACKGROUND
\2
Norris advertised employment positions, promising salaries
and benefits for "diet counselors." Norris required the
prospective "employees" to sign what they believed to be
agreements regarding the custody of the diet product. Those
agreements were in fact sales agreements wherein the "employees"
turned out to be purchasers of the product, rather than employees
entrusted with distributing the product. When the "employees"
refused to pay, Norris then sued on those contracts. He was
eventually charged with thirteen counts of communications fraud.
1(3
Norris's trial counsel assured him that the trial date would
be continued. However, on the date set for trial, the trial
court denied Norris's motion to continue. Norris's counsel then

\

urged him to plead guilty to two of the charges, rather than face
conviction for all thirteen charges, pursuant to a plea bargain
agreement offered by the prosecution before trial. Norris
followed his attorney's advice, and pleaded guilty pursuant to
State v. Serv, 758 P. 2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (allowing entry
of guilty plea conditioned upon Defendant's preservation of right
to appeal trial court's denial of suppression motion). He
conditioned his pleas upon assurances by the court and the
prosecution that certain issues would be preserved for appeal.
The court specifically enumerated the issues that Norris would
have the right to appeal once his guilty pleas were accepted and
entered.1 That enumerated list included his claim of vindictive
prosecution.2 The record indicates that 'Norris raised this issue
several times through the course of the proceedings. Although
the court had not ruled on Norris's vindictive prosecution claim,
it promised him that he had a right to appeal it. In fact, the
court stated "I would like to make a list of those motions that
1. The court itemized the following issues as preserved for
appeal:
(1) the court's denial of Norris's motion to dismiss
based on the statute of limitations; (2) the court's denial of
Norris's motion to dismiss based on the expungement of the arrest
records made in conjunction with the charges; (3) the court's
denial of Norris's motion to remove his counsel for incompetency
and conflict of interest; (4) the effective denial of Norris's
speedy trial rights; (5) Norris's vindictive prosecution claim;
(6) the State's failure to comply with discovery requests; (7)
the constitutionality of Utah's communications fraud statute; and
(8) inadequacy of the information.
2. After the court enumerated the appealable issues, Norris
struggled to identify more issues he hoped to preserve. The
court apparently satisfied Norris's trepidation by promising
Norris that "you're reserving the right to appeal any issue that
the Court has heard and ruled on, but ruled adversely to you
. . . you'd have a right to appeal that issue." The parties
agreed in oral arguments that this was the most sweeping Serv
plea they had seen. Although the breadth of the court's promises
is not an issue before us, we note our concern that blanket
preservation of issues for appeal may very well overflow the
banks of what is allowable under Sery and its progeny. See State
v. Serv, 758 P. 2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In Sery, we adopted
the practice of accepting conditional guilty pleas because
"forcing the parties to go through an entire trial merely to
preserve the suppression issue is a pointless and wasteful
exercise." Sery, 758 P. 2d at 939. Thus, conditional pleas serve
the purpose of promoting judicial economy. The broad conditional
pleas involved here, however, do not serve the ends of judicial
economy.
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you intend to reserve. You don't have to argue them. Just state
your list of motions." It is axiomatic that a party has no right
to appeal an issue unless the trial court has entered a final
appealable order disposing of it. The trial court failed to rule
on the vindictive prosecution issue, and all parties agree that
it cannot be raised on appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 3(a)
(requiring that judgment be final in order to appeal).
1[4
Norris timely moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, alleging
coercive circumstances in the inducement of those pleas.
Primarily, he alleged that his counsel was unprepared for trial
on the scheduled date. That lack of preparation, Norris alleged,
pressured him into pleading guilty unexpectedly when he had
expected the court to grant his motion to continue. He further
alleged that the trial court's assurances led him to plead guilty
in exchange for "non-existent benefits," rendering his pleas
involuntary. The trial court orally denied Norris T s motion to
withdraw his guilty, pleas, but never entered a written order to
that effect. Moreover, no signed minute entries appear in the
record evidencing the trial court's disposal of the motion.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
^[5
Although the court orally denied Norris's motion to withdraw
his guilty pleas/ the State asserts that this court lacks
jurisdiction to hear Norris's claims because it never entered a
final order on the record. An appellate court's "determination
of whether it has jurisdiction to hear an appeal is a question of
law. Specifically, the jurisdictional question in this case is
predicated upon whether an order is final and appealable, which
is a question of law." Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 UT
6,1(18, 44 P.3d 663.
Us
Norris challenges the trial court's oral denial of his
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. "We review a trial court's
denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse of
discretion standard, incorporating the clearly erroneous standard
for the trial court's findings of fact made in conjunction with
that decision." State v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60,^10, 983 P.2d 556
(quotations and citations omitted).
ANALYSIS
I-

Jurisdiction

1(7
"We first address the State's claim that this court lacks
jurisdiction. The State argues defendant [cannot] appeal[] from
unsigned minute entries" and that no written orders appear in the
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record. State v. Smith, 776 P. 2d 929, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
The State asserts that the trial court's cral rulings do not
constitute final orders for purposes of appeal. See State v.
Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978) (» [T]he law is well
settled in the state that the statements made by a trial judge
are not the judgment of the case and it is only the signed
judgment that prevails."). The State also correctly asserts that
without a final order on the record, the court has no
jurisdiction to hear an appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 3(a); see
also Anderson v. Schwendiman, 764 P.2d 999, 1000 (Utah Ct. App.
1988^) (holding notice of appeal filed after ruling has been
announced, but before entry of order disposing of motion, is
premature and does not confer jurisdiction on appellate courts).
\8
"However, defendant actually appeals from the trial court's
order of judgment and sentence which i_s a final appealable order,
and not the unsigned minute entries." Smith, 776 P.2d at 931
(emphasis added); see also Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887 (holding
sentence constitutes a final judgment from which defendant has
right to appeal). Where there is no final written order
disposing of a motion, and no appeal could otherwise ensue, a
judgment inconsistent with the motion can dispose of the motion
by necessary implication for purposes of granting this court
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Kurth v. Wiarda, 1999 Utah App 153,1(8,
981 P.2d 417 ("[T]he entry of the judgment on the verdict in
light of the surrounding circumstances operates to effectively
deny [the defendant's] motions by necessary implication.").
Here, the trial court orally denied Norris's motion to withdraw
his guilty pleas, but did not formally enter a written signed
order. However, the court did nothing to alter its acceptance of
Norris's guilty pleas and ultimately sentenced him. Thus, his
sentence constitutes a final order from which he may appeal, and
that sentence "effectively den[ies Norris's] motions by necessary
implication." Id. Accordingly, the matter is properly before
us.
II.

Norris's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas

%9
The question before us is whether the trial court abused its
discretion in refusing to grant Norris's motion to withdraw his
guilty pleas after Norris presented an affidavit describing the
alleged coercive circumstances surrounding his guilty pleas and
waiver of rights. Norris argues that the court's erroneous
assurances that he could appeal his vindictive prosecution claim
rendered his conditional guilty pleas involuntary because they
were given in exchange for "non-existent benefits."
UlO State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988), controls our
decision. In Copeland, the prosecution made promises in the plea
agreement that Defendant could receive immediate sex-offender
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treatment at an in-patient program at a hospital, rather than
waiting for prison treatment three years before release from
prison. See id. at 1267. The court ratified this suggestion
without indicating to Defendant that by statute the court had no
discretion in the choice of whether to place Defendant in
hospital treatment or prison with later treatment. See id. at
1268. The Utah Supreme Court held that such promises could
easily induce someone to plead guilty, and that such inducements
may render the plea involuntary if they mislead the defendant as
to "the nature and value of any promises made to him." Id. at
12 74. If a defendant pleads guilty "with an exaggerated belief
in the benefits of his plea . . . he should be allowed to
withdraw his plea." Id. at 1275 (quotations and citations
omitted). Further, the "defendant must be allowed to withdraw
his plea if the State made a promise it did not or could not
fulfill." IcL. at 1276.
Ull Both the trial court and the State clearly promised Norris
that he could pursue a claim for vindictive prosecution on
appeal, but neither the court nor the State could fulfill that
promise. The court's legal error exaggerated the benefits Norris
would receive from pleading guilty. Thus it misled Norris as to
"the nature and value of [the] promise[] made to him." Id. at
1274.
fl2 We conclude "it is possible that defendant was genuinely and
legitimately confused about" the value of these assurances
compared with the seriousness of pleading guilty. Id.
Accordingly, the court erred as a matter of law by promising
Norris that he could appeal a vindictive prosecution claim. A
discretionary ruling that compounds a previous harmful error of
law constitutes an abuse of discretion. See Doty v. Cedar Hills,
656 P.2d 993, 997 (Utah 1982).
1fl3 Thus, Norris 1 s pleas were not made voluntarily with full
knowledge of the consequences of pleading guilty. Accordingly,
Norris "must be allowed to withdraw his [guilty] pleats]."
Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1276. We vacate the sentence and the
1, the undersigned, Clerk of the Utah Court of
Appeals, do hereby certify i^a the foregoing Is a
full, true and correct copy o* an original document
on file in the Utah Court of /voeals. In testimony
whereof, I have set my hand a, id affixed the seal of
the Court

Paulette Sta^
Clerkpf the L

By_ILL£LQt
Deputy.
C*er,
uiy.L/erx
Date
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guilty pleas and remand for proceedings consistent with this
decision.3

Norman H. Jackson/
Presiding Judge

Orme, Judge

f

\
• t*

3 .-*-Ii>-light of this decision, we do not address Norris' s * >^
7
remaining challenges. t j
\^ jx *
*
*-
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Addendum E

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTWCTeCOUR^ru^
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, S T A T E ^ F ^ f f j ^ L ^ l

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Case No.

vs.
~f2.i'c(/\ A-*-*!

<\1l*e

*?*?

F. V^°*"*-\

Defendant.

L H > ; c i ^ a r ^ r> N o r r i S , hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been
advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights:
Notification of Charges
I am pleading guilty (orlEi^ontestypo the following crimes
Crime & Statutory
Provision

Degree
i

A.

-%b - io - trot

Ci)

A t

Punishment
Min/Max and/or
Minimum
ivimimum Mandatory
Mandator

±Jjj*c*> • **-

*

B.

o

TrL - \Q -

1201 C*)

fr

C.

D.

\si*4

I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or
had it read to me, an^J-^ff3c5staiB3\ the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am
pleading, guilty (flfno contest).
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (orpo contest)/are:

To

k^

Q U - ^ I W ^

^

rtw^.y"

j£

l.oo^

*

J

a

I understand that by plp.ading-gmljy Iwill be admitting that I committed the crimes
listed above. (Or, if I am pleadin^o-eorrtpt, I am not contesting that I committed the
foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleadmg no contest, I do not dispute or
contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for
which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty
(ojiiiQrfeeniest) pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or
(no contest):
_
~
\
T
\

&

I Oft?

AAoAJlt^J:
<r«^r- Q- d^Lyrcr^l^oY^JLMh
tuWVcL . IAA sJhs
l/w \ * U &-£Cw* r-Cy r^Slu

U>>4^_

"fcfoj^

^V-y,evAjqL>V<

O^.^-

fka-t^

[J^KJiju^po^^^
/u. M L Sprite
\a-\\&W &
Cu^Q c;aj> Se4La&vd\\^

<;JAJ_

-fkjLrw

',£^1^

0fp>-fa.Y^

-V-v.

Waiver of Constitutional Rights
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead
guilty (qrtio"contest) f)vill give up all the following rights:
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand
2
I JS3l&?1£&k^

that I might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed
lawyer's service to me.
I (have not) (have) waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right to counsel,
I have done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons:

If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that
I understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty
(or no contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the
consequences of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s).
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is S>£&*^ ^-* i N u u ^ J
My attorney a M l k w e fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of
my guilty (ofno cohte$) plea(s).
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty
fef^o^nTes^^
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a
trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and
b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to
cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me.
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a trial, I could call witnesses
if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony
of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State would
pay those costs.
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to
have a trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose
not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I also
know that if I chose not to testify, the juiy would be told that they could not hold my refusal
to testify against me.
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty
(orcng^contes^^)am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged
crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and my
case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each
3
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element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict
must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty.
I understand that if I plead guilty (OT(TIQ^OOI^^^
give up the presumption of
innocence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above.
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the
costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs foi^nejjin^rstand that I am giving up
my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (gfno co^itest)L^rimderstand that if I wish
to appeal my sentence I must file a notice of appeal within 30 days after my sentence is
entered.
I know and understand that by pleading guilty31 am waiving and giving up all the
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above.
Consequences of Entering a Guilty ((or No Contest) PJfea
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no
contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving
a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or
both.
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my
crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of
a plea agreement.
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run
at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each
crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing
on another offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no
contest), my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being
imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was
imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences would be
inappropriate.

4

Plea agreement My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) (is/are) (is/are not) the result of
a plea agreement between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and
provisions of the plea agreement, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those
explained below:
* n

Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges
for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they
believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge.
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, or unlawful
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises
except those contained in this statement have been made to me.
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to
change or delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes
because all of the statements are correct.
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.
I am 45years of age. I have attended school through the / T grade. I can read
and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drags, medication, or intoxicants which
would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the
influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment.
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing
or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea.
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I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must
file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced. I understand
that for a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw from the plea agreement must be
made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest. I will only be allowed to withdraw
my plea if I show that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. I understand that any
challenge to my plea(s) made after sentencing must be pursued under the PostConviction Remedies Act in Title 78, Chapter 35a, and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Dated this

r

day of _ 5^p4<fv^,UgV-

, 2 6£>?.

DEFENDANT

Certificate of Defense Attorney
I certify that I am the attorney for ^Cck^-^A
k)#rir If
? the defendant
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief,
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of
the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are
accurate and true.

TTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
Bar No.
fakg^
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Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against
f^icJ^e<^x,J2 AJ^r^'s
, defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of
Defendant and find that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which
constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion
to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained
in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before
the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the
conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the
acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public intei£

PROSECUCI^G ATTORNEY

Bar No. Q ^0 O-^
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Order
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses
the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely,
knowingly, and voluntarily made.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the
crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered.
Dated this

^

day of

Ssp^e^itr

?

2 ^
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DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Form revised 6/25/03

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

The parties agree to the following settlement terms and conditions in relation to State v.
RichardNorris, case no. 971008355:
1. Defendant will enter a plea of no contest to two counts of attempted
communications fraud, a class a misdemeanor. The communications supporting the two
counts are (1) the newspaper advertisement run in the spring of 1993; and (2) the in-person
meeting with the victim(s) which culminated with the signing of agreements. The artifice
devised to defraud the victims was to foil thertf ability to comply with contract agreements and
then sue and obtain judgments against them.
2. Defendant agrees to waive all appellate rights in relation to the case with the exception]
of narrow issues of the constitutionality of the charging statute and jurisdictional issues
previously raised with the Court and presently the subject of the appeal from judgment in the
Fourth District Court case, which is presently on appeal.
3. The State agrees that any restitution at issue be properly left to civil remedies,
including the results of law suits previously filed in relation to the facts and circumstances of the
present case.
4. The State agrees that the proper sentence is to close the case with credit for time
served considering that the defendant has already served more than the maximum period of
incarceration allowed upon conviction for two class A misdemeanors.

Addendum F

^

fllSB OISTKIPT . SCOTT C. WILLIAMS (6687)
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
142 East 200 South, Suite 312
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 530-1541
Facsimile: (801) 530-1549
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH

MOTION TO DISMISS BASED UPON
VINDICTIVE PROSECUTION

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
V.

RICHARD F. NORRIS,

Case No. 971008355
:

Judge: Honorable Robin Reese

Defendant.

COMES NOW the defendant, Richard Norris, by and through his counsel Scott C.
Williams, and hereby moves this court for an order dismissing the above referenced matter on the
grounds that the prosecution has repeatedly "upped the ante" on Mr. Norris by filing superseding
charging documents that repeatedly increased Mr. Norris' potential penalty whenever he exercised his
constitutional and statutory rights to directly or indirectly challenge his case or raise legal issues.
RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 20, 1994 West Valley City filed an information charging Mr. Norris with
four misdemeanor counts of communications fraud. On February 5, 1996, Third Circuit Judge Watson
dismissed the information, ruling that the misdemeanors must be consolidated into one felony count
based upon value, and the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction over felony offenses. West Valley City
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appealed Judge Watson's ruling. However, on December 10, 1996 West Valley City moved to dismiss
its appeal. Mr. Norris objected, seeking a ruling on the merits.
On March 27, 1997 the State of Utah filed an information charging Mr. Norris with 10
felony counts related to the same conduct alleged in connection with the misdemeanor prosecution.
Mr. Norris moved to dismiss the case based on the fact that the appeal was still pending. His motion
was granted on April 11, 1997. On November 19,1997 the District Court clarified that the April 11
dismissal was without prejudice.
On May 15, 1997 the State filed another Information based upon the same facts but
increasing the number of felony counts to twenty. At a preliminary hearing on that information on
February 3 and February 26, 1999 this Court dismissed 8 of the counts and bound defendant over for
trial on the remaining 12 counts. An amended information related to the 12 counts was subsequently
filed and remains the basis of the present prosecution.
ARGUMENT
The general factors implicated by a claim of vindictive prosecution by a defendant are
best described in United States v. Burt. 619 F.2d 831 (9th C ir. 1980):
The right to due process of law is violated where the government increases the severity of
alleged charges in response to the exercise of constitutional or statutory rights. United
States v. Rosales-Lopez, 617 F.2d 1349, 1357 (9th Cir. 1980); Unites States v. DeMarco,
550 F.2d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 827, 98 S.Ct. 105, 54 L.Ed.2d
85; see generally Blackledge v. Perry. 417 U.S. 21, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628
(1974); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). . .
. Vindictive prosecution is generally found where the government has occasion to reindict or re-try a defendant after the exercise of a procedural right. [Citation omitted.]. ..
. When a defendant attempts to have the charges dismissed based on an allegation of
vindictive prosecution, then the defendant must make the initial showing of an
"appearance of vincdictiveness." [Citations omitted.] In most cases, this involves a
showing that the prosecutory has re-indicted the defendant and increased the severity of
the charge, after the defendant has exercised a statutory or constitutional right. [Citations
omitted.] The defendant does not have to demonstrate that the prosecution in fact acted

i /

with a malicious or retaliatory motive. [Citations omitted.] Instead, once the defendant
has made this prima facie showing, then vindictiveness may be inferred. [Citations
omitted.]
In the present case, the government has formally charged Mr. Norris three separate times.
In each re-charging, the government has upped the ante by significantly increasing the level and
number of charges, and thus the potential penalty. Initially, in 1994, the government accused him of
misdemeanor crimes. The Circuit court did not agree, and ruled that a single felony count should be
filed in the District court. West Valley City appealed the ruling. When West Valley City later moved
to dismiss the appeal, Mr. Norris objected, since having the appellate court validate Judge Watson's
ruling would likely shape the issues in any future re-filing.
As punishment for his exercising of his statutory and constitutional rights in the course of
the misdemeanor and appellate proceedings, the government filed a felony case against Mr. Norris,
charging not one count as was ordered by Judge Watson, but ten separate felony counts. However, the
district court dismissed the 10 count Information because it had been improperly filed. Mr. Norris
sought a dismissal with prejudice, which was ultimately denied.
As punishment for continued defense of his case and exercising of his statutory and
constitutional rights, the government filed another felony information doubling the number of felony
charges to 20. Twelve of those survived preliminary hearing. (It is unclear why the present charging
document charges Mr. Norris with two counts in relation to each of six alleged victims.)
The history of this case represents a prima facie case of vindictive prosecution. Each
time the government has re-charged Mr. Norris it has severely increased the number of charges and the
potential penalty. All such filings follow a ruling by Judge Watson that a single felony count should
have resulted from the conduct alleged in the first misdemeanor Information. The multiple instances
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of "upping the ante" were seemingly motivated by frustration at Mr. Norris for repeatedly exercising
his constitutional and statutory rights.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Mr. Norris respectfully requests that this Court enter an order
dismissing the present case based upon a violation of his due process rights. Should this Court be
disinclined to grant defendant's motion based upon the pleadings, he respectfully requests an
evidentiary hearing prior to ruling on the merits.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ±_ day of April, 2003.

TTC. WILLIAMS
ttorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Dismiss was
mailed to the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, UT 84111 via
first class mail, postage paid thereon, this

2.

day of April, 2003.

L^aw^.'

?Hach
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O0O'

West Valley City,

' '-aniyn M. Branch
•"'-Kof the Court

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

Case No. 960151-CA

Richard Norris,
Defendant and Appellee.
Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Orme.
This matter is before the court pursuant to West Valley
City's motion to dismiss its appeal, to which defendant objects,
and pursuant to defendant's motion to stay this court's February
18, 1997 order, to which West Valley City objects.
West Valley City seeks to dismiss its own appeal of the
circuit court's order dismissing misdemeanor charges against
defendant on the ground that the facts supported a felony charge,
over which the circuit court did not have jurisdiction.
Subsequently, the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office indicated
its intent to file a felony charge in district court on the same
facts. Since the circuit and district courts were consolidated
in July, 1996, the district court now has jurisdiction whether
the charges are filed as felonies or as misdemeanors.
Defendant, through counsel, asserts that this appeal should
not be dismissed because West Valley City will now file_JLglpny
charges against h\m_out of vindictjveness fgx his filing of a
motion to dismiss iiLcircuit courtr: However, even—assuming the
truth of thes^aSBumptjjJil^V that issue is"~~riot' before this court
and may be""raised in a different appeal, if and when defendant is
convicted of felony charges. There is simply no reasoned
argument that West Valley City should not be allowed to dismiss
its own appeal from the circuit court's decision.
Defendant's pro se argument that this court should stay its
own order directing him to file a response to the motion to
dismiss by March 3, 1997 is without merit. The trial court does
not have jurisdiction to consider defendant's latest motion for
substitute counsel, and defendant's claim that counsel will not
adequately represent him does not appear to be supported by the
filings in this court.

I /_

Third Judicial District
MICHAEL A. PETERSON, #5130
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

PEB 0 2 1999
SALT U K E COUNTY

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
THE STATE OF UTAH,

ORDER DENYING MOTION
TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE

Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 971005698FS
JUDGE LEE A. DEVER

RICHARD F. NORRIS,
Defendant.

After full briefing of the issues, oral argument by counsel
and for good cause appearing;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's Motion to Dismiss with
Prejudice in the above-entitled case is denied.
DATED this

day of February, 1999.
BY THE COURT:
JUDGE LEE A. DlWB^v^L^r*
Third Digfrrict g^ifx'E*1""'"'
STAMP USEE

OF JUDGE

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Order to Ernie Jones,
Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84111, this

day of February, 1999.

FILID DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

DAVE) E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
GREGORY L. BOWN, 0402
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

APR 1 0 2003

Deputy Clerk

JN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS BASED UPON
VINDICTIVE PROSECUTION

-vsRICHARD F. NORRIS,

Case No. 971008355

Defendant.

Hon. Robin W. Reese

GREGORY L. BOWN, Deputy District Attorney and Attorney for the State of Utah,
responds to defendant's Motion to Dismiss Based Upon Vindictive Prosecution as follows:
FACTS
The State agrees that on December 20, 1994, the West Valley City Prosecutor had filed
an information charging the defendant with four misdemeanor counts of Communication Fraud
in case number 941004929. As indicated in the docket of that matter on February 5, 1996, Judge
Watson stated "West Valley City vs Richard Norris is before the Court on a Motion to Strike the
Initial Information as void on the basis it is lacking sufficient information to advise the defendant
of persons alleged defrauded and the scheme or artifice utilized, precluding ability to prepare a
defense. The Motion to Strike was filed subsequent to a defense request for a Bill of Particulars.
The City Prosecutor filed an Amended Information. Thereafter, the defense filed a Motion to
Quash the Amended Information alleging an invalid or void initial Information cannot be
amended charging crimes now barred by the running of the Statute of Limitations. The Court
received memorandums from both parties. In process of reviewing the voluminous paperwork
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STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS BASED UPON
VINDICTIVE PROSECUTION
Case No. 971008355
Page 2

submitted by the city, the Court became concerned whether it was examining material that may
never be admitted into evidence at the trial of the case and may require the Court to recuse itself
for examining such investigative material. As it always does, in reviewing a case, the Court
reviewed to confirm Jurisdiction of the Court. Statute 76-10-1801, U.C.A., 1953, as amended,
under which the offenses are charged, indicates in subparagraph two (2) thereof, 'the
determination of the degree of any offense under subsection (1) shall be measured by the total
value of all property, money, or things obtained or sought to be obtained by the scheme or
artifice described in subsection (1) . . . ' The initial information is silent as to the number of
victims and measure of value. The Amended Information names four victims in four counts and
measures value of more that $300 in each count. On January 4, 1996, the court sent letter to both
parties, Mr David Maddox for the defendant and Mr Keith Stoney for the prosecution, requesting
input in they desired, on the issue of jurisdiction. Response was received from the defense.
None was received from the City for the Court's Review prior to making its decision the 5 day
of February, 1996. In an attempt to resolve the issue of jurisdiction, the court reviewed some of
the investigative material submitted by the City and determined the $1000 jurisdictional amount
for Circuit Court jurisdiction had been exceeded.

For example, a letter of demand from

defendant Norris to a single victim of four alleged in the Information demands $1,6000.
Therefore, the Court finds the Circuit Court lacks jurisdiction of the felonious actions alleged in
the Amended Information. As a result, the Court does not reach the issue of striking the initial
information for voidness or the issue to quash the Amended Information for running of the
statute of limitations as raised by the defense." The State believes that Judge Watson did not rule
that "the misdemeanors must be consolidated into one felony count based upon value:
(Defendant Motion page 1) The State has no reason to disbelieve that, having appealed Judge
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VINDICTIVE PROSECUTION
Case No. 971008355
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Watson's Order dismissing the matter, the West Valley City Prosecutor moved to dismiss its
appeal, the defendant objected to the dismissal of the appeal, and the appeal continued.
The State agrees that on M2^c\27jl9979

Former Prosecutor, Ernie Jones, of the Salt

Lake County District Attorney's Office filed an information in case number 971005698 charging
the defendant with 10 felony counts of Communication Fraud, each felonies, based not only
upon the conduct of the defendant as represented by the conduct involved in the Judge Watson
case and additional similar conduct involving additional victims which had been discovered
subsequently to the filing of the misdemeanors by the West Valley City Prosecutors.

The

Remittitur on the Dismissal of the Appeal was not received until Mav 19,jl997. The defendant
filed a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court shortly thereafter and the West Valley court did
not receive a letter from the Supreme Court denying the defendant's Petition for Writ of
Certiorari on September 30, 1997. The State agrees that on April 11, 1997, in case number
971005698, Judge Lee Dever of this Court ordered ".. . that while this case in pending before the
Court of Appeals and until that Court issues a Remittitur, this Court Js_prohibited from
proceeding and therefore grantsDef^

(Docket case

number 971005698, page 2) The defendant subsequently made a Motion to Dismiss With
Prejudice, which was denied on December 4, 1998.
The State agrees that on May 15, 1997, Mr. Jones filed another Information in case
number 971008355 charging 20 counts of third degree felony Communications Fraud, alleging
no further victims but alleging two "communications" under the Communications Fraud statute
for each victim.

STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS BASED UPON
VINDICTIVE PROSECUTION
Case No. 971008355
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At the Preliminary Hearing on February 3 and 26, 1999, only 6 victims appeared and
testified. Judge Palmer agreed that each victim had received two communications and bound the
case over for trial on the essence of-the Amended Information now before this Court.
ARGUMENT
The defendant errs in his analysis of Vindictive Prosecution case law by arguing that an
inference of vindictive prosecution allows a court to make a finding of vindictive prosecution.
The defendant relies upon United State v. Burt, a decision from the Ninth Circuit, for this
proposition. However, Burt is clear that an inference of vindictive prosecution creates a shift in
the burden to the prosecution to rebut the inference. See Burt, 619 F.2d 831, 836 (9th Cir. 1980)
("At this point, the burden then shifts to the prosecution to prove that the increase in the severity
of the charges did not result from an vindictive motive").
The Tenth circuit Court of appeals applies a slightly more rigorous standard for the
defendant who would argue vindictive prosecution. The Tenth Circuit has stated, "[a] defendant
has the burden of proof and must establish either (1) actual vindictiveness, or (2) a realistic
likelihood of vindictiveness which will give rise to a presumption of vindictiveness. Thereafter,
the burden shifts to the prosecution to justify its decision with legitimate, articulable, objective
reasons." United States v. P.H. R, 965 F.2d 848, 860 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v.
Raymer, 941 F.2d 1031, 1040 (10th Cir. 1991)).
A few United States Supreme Court cases obliquely address the vindictive prosecution
issue. In the instances where the Supreme Court found vindictive prosecution, it is important to
note that the defendant had previously been convicted of misdemeanor charges and then when
the defendant appealed the convictions, the prosecutor brought more serious, felony charges.

STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS BASED UPON
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See generally Thigpen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27 (1984); and Blackledge v. Perry, All U.S. 21
(1974).
It is submitted that rather than as "punishment for his exercising of his statutory and
constitutional rights in the course of the misdemeanor and appellate proceedings/' the State,
through its designated representative, Mr. Jones, simply agreed wrthjhidg^

thatjthe^

conduct rose to the level of a felony offense. Upon an investigation, more victims were located
and added as counts in the information.
That information (971005698) was dismissed without prejudice because it was filed
before the remittitur had been returned. When the case was refiled after all the appellate issues
had been decided, it is apparent that the number of counts was doubled because each of the ten
victims had received two communications from the defendant, the first was the advertisement in
the newspaper and the second was at a meeting with the defendant. It is obvious that Judge
Palmer agreed with the State's allegation with regard to two communications at the Preliminary
Hearing.
It is submitted that defendant's conjecture that the history of this case represents a prima
facie case of vindictive is erroneous. It is submitted that the history and record of this case
shows no reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness. It is submitted that what happened in this case
was a defendant who tried^every method available to him to dela^the filing of felony charges
which simply allowed the State to more adequately investiggtejiiscase, find more victims and
better analyze the statute applying to th&Jracts of this defendant's conduct to charge the
appropriate number of counts.

"

.

— /""v -*k.
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CONCLUSION
There is no rule that the State is put in a stasis field upon the filing of any charges by any
governmental agency and cannot continue to investigate the defendant's conduct. It is submitted
that is exactly what happened in this case and no reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness is
apparent or has been shown by the defendant.
In the event that this court should find a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness, the State
requests that this matter be set for an evidentiary hearing where the State can rebut such a
finding.
DATED this 9th day of April, 2003.
DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney

GREGORY L. BOWN
Deputy District Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing State's Response To
Defendant's Motion To Dismiss Based Upon Vindictive Prosecution was delivered to Scott C.
Williams, Attorney for Defendant Richard F. Norris, at 142 East 200 South, Suite 312, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84111 on the

day of April, 2003.
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2
3
4

THE COURT:

State of Utah versus Richard Franklin

Norris, Jr., who is present with his attorney, Mr. Williams.

5

And I understand, Mr. Norris, that this hearing that

6

was set today to schedule a hearing on your motion to dismiss,

7

you would like continued and like that continued for about six

8

weeks; is that correct?

9
10

MR. NORRIS: Yes.
THE COURT:

And again, as every time we've done

11

this, you're willing to acknowledge that the disposition of

12

detainers that you had filed would be—this—this continuance

13

would not be held against the State, that you're.requesting it

14

willfully and the State is prepared to go forward on the

15

motion, and that despite that fact, you're still interested in

16

postponing that; is this correct?

17

MR. NORRIS: Yes.

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. NORRIS: Yes.

20

THE COURT:

21

You've done it voluntarily?

You don't feel you've been coerced by

anybody to do this?

22

MR. NORRIS: No.

23

THE COURT: And the State doesn't object?

24

MR. BOWN:

25

THE COURT:

That's correct, your Honor.
But you are prepared to go forward?

1

1"

MR. BOWN: Yes.

2

THE COURT: What about July the 29th at 2:00

3
4

o'clock?
MR. WILLIAMS: What we had talked about, your Honor,

5

is, unfortunately, I'm unavailable until ths 28th to try to

6

schedule with Mr. Norris a meeting at the Utah County Jail to-

7

-in relation to a box of documents that I'm going to have

8

taken to him, hopefully tomorrow.

9

could set it on August 11th, it will allow me two weeks

And for that reason, if you

10

between when I get back into town and August 11th to find the

11

time to hopefully, adequately, consult with Mr. Norris.

12

THE COURT: All right. August the 11th at 10:30.

13

MR. BOWN:

14

THE COURT:

15

That Will just be a scheduling conference.

16

note for the record the State's interest in going forward, but

17

grant instead the defense motion to continue.

Is that a Monday?
It is.

18

And we'll see you back then.

19

MR. WILLIAMS:

We'll

And Judge, for the benefit of the

20

record and Mr. Norris, in acknowledgement of the fact that

21

your Honor had denied a prior motion to vacate the hold in

22

this case, I will need to prepare an order for your signature

23

to finalize that motion, if it had—if it wasn't final before.

24

THE COURT: Okay.

25

MR. WILLIAMS:

And I'll prepare that and present it

1

to the Court as soon as possible for your signature.

2

THE COURT: All right.

3

I'll sign it as soon as

receive it.

4

MR. WILLIAMS:

Thank you.

5

THE COURT: Okay.

6 I

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)
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1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2
3

THE COURT:

4

MR. WILLIAMS:

5

THE COURT:

6

State of Utah versus Richard Franklin Norris, Jr.

7

Judge, Richard Norris.

I'll call that case next.

Set today as a scheduling conference, I believe.

8
9

Yes, sir?

MR. WILLIAMS:

It is, Judge.

I believe and I'm

really optimistic that we 7 11 be able to resolve this case.

1Q

I've talked to Mr. Bown about the specifics and I intend to

11

put that, finalize it i n — i n a formal letter today, I hope,

12

and get it to Mr. Bown, who will do some follow-up that he

13

needs to do.

14

a—another hearing for disposition, change of plea on the

15

25th.

16

finalized and in writing.

And we think that the best thing to ask for is

That gives us two weeks t o — t o make sure everything is

17

MR. BOWN:

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. BOWN:

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. WILLIAMS:

22

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)

23
24
25

That's correct, your Honor.
All right.
Okay.

August the 25th, 10*30*

Thank you.

Uh huh.
Thank you, your Honor.

* * *
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P R O C E E D I N G S

THE COURTt

Yes?

MR, WILLIAMS: Good morning, your Honor.

I have—

THE COURT: Yes,
MR* WILLIAMS:
THE COURT:

the Norris matter,

I711 call that case.

State of Utah versus Richard Franklin Norris.
MR. BOWN:

Greg Bown for the State.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. WILLIAMS: Judge, Mr. Norris wasn't transported.
THE COURT: Oh.
MR. WILLIAMS:

So, we just need to look at—we

believe with some confidence, that the case is resolved.
THE COURT:

I see.

MR. WILLIAMS: And, as a matter of fact, I spoke to-it did involve approaching your Honor.

Again, we've done so

in the past wheh Mr. Norris desires us to approach pursuant to
Rule 11(H) at some point and see whether or not he'll indicate
that he'll follow ;the resolution.

It's a couple misdemeanors

and closure of the cas£, because he's already served more time
than what the—even consecutive sentences could garner him on
these (inaudible)
THE COURT:

You—given what the Board of Pardons

would do, you mean, if he'd been given consecutive sentences?

2

MR. WILLIAMS:

Well, no, it's-—

MR. BOWN: No. No*
MR. WILLIAMS:

The plea is to two A's.

THE COURT: Oh, I see.
MR. WILLIAMS: And he's done more than two years.
THE COURT: Oh, I see.
MR* WILLIAMS:
THE COURT:

That h e —

I see.

MR* WILLIAMS: That h e —
MR. BOWN:

Yeah, he's done more than two years,

so.
THE COURT:
MR. BOWN:

I see.
And then it's not—the victims aren't

looking for restitution anymore and there's civil matters,
just civil suits that have pretty much resolved all that
anyway.
THE COURT: Well, I—I would approve it if the State
recommends it, so...
MR. WILLIAMS: So, we just need a date and I know
that the 8th, Monday the 8th is the next Monday you have, but
»

I didn't know whether or not you had any desire to set it on a
different setting.
THE COURT:

Yes.

I probably would, Monday the 8th.

Well, no, we can do it next Monday, that's fine. Or a week
Monday, rather, Monday the 8th at 10:30.
3

All right. Monday, September the 8th, 10:30.
MR. WILLiAMS:

Thank you, Judge.

That's all I have,

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)

* * *
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